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concept is applied to capture the fishers' tendency to cooperate (ö1). Profits from fishing
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one player's best strategy coincides with the other player's best strategy, the game has a
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FISHERIES CO-MANAGEMENT: A GAME THEORY PERSPECTIVE
I. INTRODUCTION
The main aim of this study is to investigate whether certain biological
characteristics of an exploited fish stock influence fishers' decisions to cooperate with
other fishers. This study focuses on fishers' behavior in a fishing cooperative
organization where fisheries co-management is practiced. Under the particular
co-management arrangement the fishers receive shares of a catch quota issued by a
central authority but the fishers may decide to cheat and catch more than their quota
shares, in which case the co-management system has failed. The study examines factors
that might cause such internal conflict among the members, which is one serious problem
in co-management (Jentoft, 1989). To resolve this problem it is important to understand
the key factors that may influence cooperative commitment and cause internal conflict
among the members. This thesis hypothesizes that the biological parameters of the fish
stock may play a crucial role in influencing fishers' cooperation.
Fisheries co-management is an alternative to centralized fisheries management in
which only a government authority has full responsibility for management. It has been
recognized that centralized management gives rise to illegitimacy because of the
restrictive fishing regulations that management imposes on fishers' behavior (Nielsen and
Vedsmand, 1997; Noble, 2000; White and Mace, 1988;). The restrictive regulations are a
product of the well known open access fisheries paradigm, which portrays the fishers as
self-interested and whose actions jeopardize the fish resources. The only way to prevent
overexploitation of the resource is by imposing regulations to control the fishing activity2
(Jentoft, 1989). Under an open access fishery, fishing regulations, which aim to protect
the biological sustainability of the fish stocks, are restrictive on how, which, when,
where, and how many fish may be caught (Kahn, 1995). The restrictive regulations
contradict the fishers' interests of maximizing their profits and, hence, become
unacceptable for the fishers. In contrast, fisheries co-management is an arrangement
whereby the government and the fish resource users jointly share responsibility, including
decision-making (Hanna, 1995; Jentoft, 1989; and Pinkerton, 1989). The fishers have a
chance to express their opinions and concerns, participate in the decision making process,
and bring in legitimate regulations.
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Fisheries co-management has the potential for solving certain problems of
fisheries management, but in practice some fishing communities have had unsuccessful
experiences with co-management (Pinkerton, 1989; Pollnac and Carmo, 1980). Several
studies have attempted to analyze cooperative behavior to determine why co-management
is not always successful. Most of the studies have been descriptive. They address and
discuss economic and social concerns as factors in either the success or failure of
co-management. Examples are the studies of Hanna (1995), Jentoft (1989), Kuperan and
Abdullah (1994), and Pinkerton (1989), which address the merits of co-management and
are concerned about preconditions for the success of co-management. The potential
merits of co-management commonly discussed in those studies include: resource
sustainability; easier implementation and enforcement; less conflict among resource
users; and lower cost of sharing the fisheries resources for the users. However, none of3
the published studies have examined the role of biological factors on the cooperative
behavior of fishers. The fishers' behavior may be affected by their knowledge about the
fishery resources.
The analytical studies have been confmed to the problem of conflicts between
co-owners of transboundary fish stocks. A transboundary fish stock is a highly migratory
fish stock, a fish stock found in the coastal Exclusive Economic Zone that is shared by
more than one nation, or a fish stock that is categorized as a straddling stock (Kaitala and
Munro, 1995; Rettig, 1995). Neither country completely owns the stock--each has control
over the stock only during the time when the stock is present in its waters. These studies
have applied the theory of differential games to account for the dynamic aspects of the
fish stock in order to explore conflicts between the two countries that share the stock. The
goal of these studies was to define optimal harvests so that a cooperative agreement could
be reached. They did not directly investigate the effect of biological factors on
cooperative behavior.
Fishers may have good intuition about trends in the growth characteristic of a fish
stock; they may have a sense about whether it is worthwhile to commit to a cooperative
organization. For example, if the future is uncertain, as with a stock having a fast but
variable growth rate and short life span, such as shrimp, shell fish, and squid (Nagasaki,
1993), the fishers might be unsure that the reward from cooperating would outweigh the
costs. In addition, fishers normally try to maximize their profits in the short term so that
they can pay off their debts (Townsend and Pooley, 1995; Cunningham, Dunn, and
Whitmarsh, 1985). In contrast, fisheries co-management aims at the long-term goal of
resource sustainability. Under variable environmental conditions a fish stock has both bad4
years and good years. During a bad year, managers would want to reduce the catch or
even to prohibit fishing to enhance the rebuilding of the stock. The question is whether
the fishers can accept the risk of long-term responsibilities of cooperative management
when they need money to pay off their debts. Therefore, the fishers' attitudes towards
risk may be an important influence on their decision to cooperate, especially given great
uncertainty about future conditions in the fish stock.
According to Marwell and Schmitt (1975) cooperation that implies joint access or
control over resources has different types of risks, which strongly influence the tendency
of resource users to cooperate with each other. For fisheries there are risks associated
with changes in the fish stocks. In a study of Pollnac and Carmo (1980), risk concerning
changes of the resource had an impact on the tendency of fishers to cooperate with each
other. The higher the uncertainty concerning changes in the resources the lower the
tendency to cooperate. Specifically, they found that when the fish resources became
scarce due to the pressure of heavy exploitation the fishers perceived high risk
concerning the status of the resource and consequently were less cooperative.
The biological status of the resource will be uncertain due to changing
environmental conditions or variation in population parameters such as growth or
reproduction. Therefore, the fishers' tendencies to cooperate could be influenced by the
uncertainty of the fish resources due to variable biological factors. Certain characteristics
of a fish stock, such as either low abundance or high variability in its natural productivity,
will contribute to a perception of high risk, which decreases the fishers' tendency to
cooperate.5
Another type of risk that an individual fisher may face is the risk that other fishers
will overexploit the resources. This type of risk induces interpersonal distrust, which also
decreases the tendency to cooperate (Poilnac and Carmo, 1980). The fishers would want
to cooperate if they could expect the others to do the same.
Because risk preference often differs among individuals (Luce and Raiffa, 1957),
the fishers may have different responses to risk and, hence, different tendencies to
cooperate. The fishers who are more willing to gamble on the uncertainty of the stock are
risk takers. Because of their willingness to bear the risk of uncertainty in the fish stocks,
these fishers would believe that they could do better by themselves rather than by joining
a cooperative organization, hence they have less tendency to cooperate. In contrast, those
fishers who are less willing to gamble on the uncertainty of the stock are risk averse.
They perceive that the benefit from joining the cooperative outweighs the benefit from
operating outside the cooperative. Different risk preferences among the fishers means that
the fishers are heterogeneous. Heterogeneity in the fishers' risk preference could
contribute to lack of trust and result in the breakdown of the cooperative arrangement.
One common criticism of standard game theory models is the unrealistic
assumption that the players are homogeneous, that the players do not differ in their tastes,
information, and culture (Rasmusen, 1992; Wildavsky, 1992; Tullock, 1992). When a
modeler applies game theory he could fail to capture the different perceptions that could
be a key factor in the players' decisions to choose particular strategies. The modeler
might actually distort the potential strategies selected by the players and, consequently,
falsify the solution of the game. Therefore, any conclusion from a study applying game
theory would be invalid when pertaining to a situation involving heterogeneous players.With regard to the problems I have outlined, I hypothesize that biological
parameters may have an influence on fishers' decisions to cooperate. Furthermore, I
propose that we need to apply game theory in a more specific and appropriate manner
that makes explicit provisions for heterogeneous players. The problem of ignoring player
heterogeneity is not a failure of game theory, but a lack of appreciation about the nature
of human heterogeneity on the part of the modelers or researchers. Game theory can be
applied to many situations, including player heterogeneity (Rasmusen, 1992). Therefore,
applying game theory in the study of a conflict situation among heterogeneous players is
plausible. However, a specialized game specific to the situation will need to be developed
to address these crucial aspects.
OBJECTIVES
The general goal of this research is to understand cooperative behavior of fishers
with respect to co-management. This research will focus on why fisheries
co-management works in some circumstances but not in others.
The specific objectives of this research are:
1.to use game theory to investigate how biological factors influence whether fishers
willremain in a cooperative management arrangement under which all fishers receive
equal shares of a fishery catch quota; and
2.to apply game theory to the situation in which the players are heterogeneous in their
attitudes towards risk and, hence, their tendencies to cooperate.7
ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION
This study is divided into 6 chapters. The first chapter, the introduction, includes a
statement of the problems and objectives of the study. Chapter 2 is a literature review of
the published background information needed for the analysis. Chapter 3 is the analytical
framework that presents the scope of the analysis and the general information and
theoretical concepts applied in the analysis. Chapter 4 is the analyses of the fishery game,
given various scenarios related to combinations of the parameters in the fishery game.
Chapter 5 discusses the set of scenarios that illustrate the influence of biological
parameters on fishers' decisions to cooperate. Chapter 6 presents conclusions drawn from
this study, some recommendations for future studies, and general suggestions for
fisheries co-management.8
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
CO-MANAGEMENT/COMMUNITY-BASED FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
DEFINITION
Community-based fishery management is rooted in the concept that the
community takes responsibility for monitoring and enforcement of management plans.
However, it is unlikely that communities can successfully implement fisheries
management on their own (Pomeroy, 1994). The government must be involved as a
co-manager with the communities. Despite being knowledgeable about their resources,
the fishers need financial support and guidance in managing their communities. In its
broad context, co-management is joint management through a cooperative organization
of government and resource users (Hanna, 1995; Jentoft, 1989; and Pinkerton, 1989).
Co-management involves decentralized control in which the government and the
communities share management responsibilities and the initiation of regulations.
Communities participate in the decision-making process, and make and implement the
regulations. Communities are involved in determining fisheries management measures,
supervising their implementation and invoking penalties when management measures and
guidelines are ignored (Doulman, 1993).
The terms, co-management and community-based management are
interchangeable (Kuperan and Abdullah, 1994; Pinkerton, personal communication).
They both refer to management in which the community plays a major role and holds
significant power to make decisions. However, there is no universally accepted definitionof either co-management or community-based fisheries management (Lim, Matsuda,
Shigemi, 1995; Yamamoto, 1995).
BA CKGROUND ON COMMUNITY BASED FISHERIES MANA GEMENT
(CBMF)
Centralized management has been the traditional management tool for fisheries
resources. However, it has rarely been successful because of failures in implementation
and enforcement (Jentoft, 1989; Pinkerton, 1989; Hanna, 1995). Most fisheries
regulations have been established based upon a government's perspective towards the
fisheries resource, which is typically focused on resource conservation. The regulations
restrict fishing activities, which can result in higher costs for fishers. For example, a
regulation restricting the fishing season may lead fishers to invest in better technology so
they can catch enough fish within the shorter season, which leads to a competitive race
for fish.
Many countries have sought alternative management approaches because their
resources continue to be depleted in spite of having a centralized management system.
Resource managers recognize that many coastal communities from various parts of the
world have been very successful at self-regulation (Lewis and Cowens, 1982; Berkes,
1985). Fisheries regulations made by the people in the community are based upon the
fishers' perception of the fish resource and the prevailing environmental conditions that
the fishers experience. Under these circumstances, it is easier for the fishers to adopt
regulations established from their perspective because they perceive them as being fair
(Jentoft, 1989). The recognition of successful self-regulation, combined with evidence of
stock depletion and the failures of centralized management have encouraged conimunity10
planners, development workers, anthropologists, biologists, geographers, and
environmental scientists to develop both the theory and the practice of community-based
management (Berkes, 1985; Jentoft, 1989). This form of management has been of
particular interest to many fisheries organizations, including the Fisheries Department of
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations.
EXAMPLES OF COOPERATIVE ORGANIZATIONS
Most of the published literature addresses and discusses only social and economic
concerns in the success or failure of co-management, such as social and economic equity.
Co-management participants voluntarily cooperate if they perceive fairness in being
cooperative. Concerns about the biological status of the resource have been addressed
only broadly in terms of resource sustainability--sustainability is required as a
precondition of success. None of the literature expresses concern about how the fishers
may respond to the uncertainty of the resource, which, in turn, is likely to affect resource
sustainability. Most fishing problems in co-managed fisheries are caused by conflicts and
competition among the cooperative organizations' members (Weinstein, 2000). These
problems could possibly be driven by different responses to the uncertainty regarding
resource status among the members of the cooperative.
Despite the limited information available from the published literature, I will give
some examples to demonstrate the potential significance of biological parameters on
co-management, specifically on fishers' decisions to cooperate. The examples are
Japanese Fisheries Cooperative Associations (FCA5), some of which have successful
co-managed fisheries and some have had failed attempts at co-management. The relative11
success of co-management is considered with respect to its degree of competition and
conflict--the more successful the co-management the less competition and conflict among
the participants.
Selecting case studies only from the Japanese co-managed fisheries reduces the
influence of differences in ethnicity, culture and environment when making a comparison
between the more and less successful cases. There is evidence that the cultural
background and norms of fishers are factors that influence the success of
co-management. As acknowledged by Lim, Matsuda and Shigemi (1995), compliance
behavior, conflict avoidance and cultural values are important to the Japanese, and are
factors contributing to the success of Japanese co-management. The Japanese tend to be
respectful and obedient to regulations. They tend to compromise and prefer to avoid
conflict. Their cultural values give them strong spirit in committing to collective values
and participatory decision-making in management.
In order to understand more about the Japanese co-management system, I give
some brief and general information on historic and present day Japanese FCAs and,
subsequently, some examples of FCAs. The details on the evolution of Japanese fisheries
co-management, fisheries law, and cooperative organization are well documented in the
literature, including Ruddle (1985), Kawaguchi and Naruko (1993), Hirasawa (1993),
Yamamoto (1993) and (1995), Lim, Matsuda, and Shigemi (1995); and Weinstein (2000).
Throughout this paper, the terms co-management and community-based fisheries
management are used interchangeably. However, most of the reviews of the Japanese
fisheries management use the term community-based fisheries management, therefore, I
will use that term exclusively in this section.12
Japanese Community-based Fisheries Management and
Fishery Cooperative Associations
Japanese community-based fisheries management (CBFM) has been developed
mainly for coastal and near-shore fisheries. Particularly with the Japanese, CBFM refers
to a management system that is initiated by fishers. Most CBFM systems deal with
inshore fish resources, particularly sedentary species such as abalone, top shell, spiny
lobster, sea urchin, and clam. A few CBFM systems deal with migratory species, such as
Kuruma prawn, mantis shrimp, red sea bream, and flat fish (Yamamoto, 1995). The goals
of CBFM systems are mainly the effective use of fishing grounds and market-oriented
measures. This traditional form of management has been practiced since 1743
(Yamamoto 1995). Japanese fisheries management, which has been evolving for more
than 250 years, can be classified into three periods: the Feudal era, the Blank Period
without fishery law, and the Old Fishery Law Period. In the Feudal era (1743-1867), the
first Japanese fishery law (Ura Law) was enacted. Fishing rights were granted to fishing
villages along the Japanese coast. However, the main purpose of those fishing rights was
for tax collection.
During the Blank Period (1868-1900), the Japanese government (the Meiji
Government) tried to modernize their country and introduced Western concepts to many
fields, including governance, economics, education, technology, and fisheries
management. As a result, the ownership of fisheries reverted to the central government in
1876 (Ruddle, 1985). For 32 years Japanese fisheries management followed Western
resource management practices, mainly based on open access fishing in which everyone
has access to the fish resources. This type of management practice consequently gave rise
to conflict among the fishers (Weinstein, 2000; Yamamoto, 1995; Ruddle, 1985).13
The period of Old Fishery Law was from 1901 to 1948. After the disappointing
Blank Period, the Japanese restored their traditional fishery management practice
(Yamamoto, 1995). The government established new fishery laws based solely on the
traditional management that was practiced in the Feudal era. Every fishing village was
required to have a Fishery Society (FS) that was granted fishing rights. Only the members
of the FS could participate in that fishery.
In 1933, the government tried to improve fishers' incomes and their living
conditions. The infrastructure of Fishery Societies was changed to allow the fishers to get
more involved in the management, especially in marketing. Consequently, fishing rights
were transferred to Fishery Cooperative Associations (FCA) in 1948. Under the Fisheries
Cooperative Law, each fishing village was required to establish its own FCA whose
fishing rights and licenses were granted within its territory. The FCAs were responsible
for establishing fishing zones, seasons, gear, and methods of fishing. In addition, the
FCAs supported their members in terms of marketing, the supply of fishing gear, and
banking.
Current Fishery Law (1949-present) came formally into effect with the reform of
fishing rights in which the central government granted control of the FCA's to the
prefectural governments (Weinstein, 2000; Yamamoto 1993,1995; Ruddle, 1985). A
prefectural government is a local government, equivalent to a state or provincial
government. There are 47 prefectures in Japan, each of which has it own government.
Within a prefecture, the fishing area is grouped into two or more regions based upon
homogeneity of environmental conditions and the fish resources. A regional fisheries
coordination committee, consisting of 16 members, 9 elected from fishers and 714
appointed by the prefectural government, is responsible for a coastal fisheries
management plan (CFMP). The committee serves on behalf of the regional fishers'
interest and also acts as a consulting committee for the prefectural government. Each
FCA establishes regulations and also implements the control and operation of various
groups of fishers in an equitable, efficient and sustainable manner, as localconditions
dictate. Even though the FCAs have the primary authority for regulating the fisheries, all
regulations have to be agreed to by all parties involved in management, including central
and prefectural government staffs, individual FCAs' members and their fishery groups.
The main management techniques for the Japanese community-based fishery
management are fishing rights and fishing licenses. The fishing rights are specifically for
coastal fisheries, while the fishing licenses are for offshore and distant water fisheries.
Fishing rights are rights to participate in fishing activities that are specified for a
particular fishery within a certain area. Under the fishery cooperative law, each FCA has
a committee called the FCA Fishing Right Management Committee (FCAFRMC) that
develops a fishing rights plan and proposes the plan to the prefectural government.
From the establishment of FCAs in 1948 to 1988, the Japanese community-based
fisheries management was done on a case-by-case basis (Hasegawa, 1993; Yamamoto,
1995). Formal nationwide community-based management began in 1988 when the
Fishery Census, which is conducted every five years, defined a fisherman-initiated
Fisheries Management Organization (FMO). The FMO includes two components: (1)
fishers who are engaged in the same mode of fishing, such as within the same fishing
gear type and class of boat, or who share a common fishing ground; and (2) management
aimed at collective management of the fish resources, fishing grounds and fishing15
operations. Most of the FMOs are formed under the initiative and guidance of FCAs.
Hence, there is a close relationship between FCAs and FMOs. The Fishery Census
classifies this relationship into four categories (Hasegawa, 1993): (1)a FMO is managed
by a FCA or it is the FCA by itself; (2) a FMO is formed by fishers with regard to the
fisheries cooperative law; (3) a FMO is organized by the will of the members of fisheries
cooperatives; and (4) a FMO is founded by other organizations.
In sum, Japanese community-based fisheries management is a collaborative
management of FCAs and their affiliates, including central government, and prefectural
government. The FCAs are responsible for distributing fishing rights to their members,
including conducting business activities under fishery cooperative law suchas obtaining
or giving credits to their members, marketing, guidance (education and leadership
development activities) and supporting services (such as ice manufacturing, freezing and
cold storage).
More Successful FCAs
A unique characteristic that is the main reason for the success of the Japanese
community-based fisheries management is ownership of rights to fishing territory (Lim,
Matsuda, and Shigemi, 1995). Fishers have incentive to fish conservatively being the
owners of the resources. In addition, exercising co-management specifically to sedentary
resources within a coastal area contributes to the success. The combination of being
limited to coastal fishing areas and relatively immobile species makes it easierto clearly
specifr the ownership of fishing rights, which consequently reduces conflict and16
competition among fishers or fishery groups. The less conflict and competition among
the members, the more successful the co-management (Yamamoto, 1995).
The following case studies concern the Nomaike FCA (Lim, Matsuda, and
Shigemi, 1995) and the Katsuura FCA (Katsuura Fishermen's Cooperative Association,
1992). Both cases were selected because these FCAs have been successful and because
there is information on co-management as well as basic information on the fisheries.
They also indicate a possible correlation between fish stock characteristics and fishers'
cooperation.
The Nomaike FCA.Founded in 1949, the Nomaike FCA is a successful Japanese
FCA, with few conflicts among its member throughout the history of the association.
There are many kinds of fishery in the fishing villages of the Nomaike FCA, including
pole, line, set-net, marlin drift net, and gill net. Most of the fisheries are small-scale,
family businesses. The biggest portion of the catch is sardine, accounting for 14% of the
landing. Other species that are frequently caught are yellowtail, chicken grunt, bonito,
mackerel, flying fish, and filefish. Fishers also target high priced species, such as
yellowtail larvae, young yellowtail, abalone, lobster, scorpion fish, flatfish, Japanese
parrotfish, sawedge perch, and sea bream.
Formally, most fishing regulations are not highly detailed and restrictive. In
practice, however, there are rules that restrict fishing operations. For example, there are
no formal regulations defining fishing areas and seasons for sedentary species, such as
abalone, spiny lobster, sea urchin, and Japanese ivory shell. But practically, the fishers
themselves set the fishing rules on fishing area and season, including specification of
fishing gear (such as length, height, and mesh size for set net).17
Despite its success with few conflicts, the Nomaike FCA has been facing a
problem of a lack of new fishers. The membership has declined since 1960, from 572
members to 377 members in 1992. The main reason for the decline is low productivity of
the fish stocks. Young people have been forced to move into the big city for better paying
jobs because of the lack of alternative jobs within their prefectures and encouragement
from their parents. Being aware of the risks of the fishing business, most parents believe
that other jobs would be better for their children than fishing.
TheKatsuura FCA. The popular fishery in Katsuura is lobster, which spreads
along the Pacific coast of Katsuura city, in the Wakayama prefecture. The fishing season
is from September 10 to April 30, but intense fishing occurs during a short 10 to 20 day
period from November to December. The lobsters are fished mainly by bottom gill net.
Management measures for the lobster fishery are limited entry and a pooi account system.
The limited entry was established by a group of lobster fishers in 1959, after a period of
decreasing catch in the 1940s and 1950s. Only fishers who have been members for more
than two years are allowed to fish in the best fishing ground around the Yamari Island.
The rules were revised in 1975, allowing fishers who have been members for one to three
years to fish within the fair fishing grounds. Only those who have been members for five
and seven years are allowed to fish within good fishing grounds. Fishers who have been
members for eight years or longer are allowed to fish in the excellent fishing ground
around the Yamari Island. Those fishers who have been entitled to fish in the excellent
fishing ground for more than four years receive a 100% share from the pool account. In
1984, the rules were relaxed so that fishers who have been members for the first six years
can harvest lobsters in all fishing grounds except the excellent ones. Those who have18
been members for seven or more years can now fish in the excellent fishing ground with
a 100% share from the pooi account system.
Unlike the Nomaike FCA, whose management success is based on the fishers'
behaviors, compliance behavior, conflict avoidance, and culture values, the Katsuura
FCA' success is attributed to the pool account system. Under the pool account system
profits are equally shared among the fishers. The equal profit scheme consequently
reduces competition among the fishers in the lobster fishery, where, prior to the
introduction of the pool account system, the fishery was overwhelmed by high
competition, especially on the very productive fishing grounds.
By their nature, lobsters normally do not migrate and are relatively immobile.
Accordingly, fishing boats aggregate and crowd particular fishing grounds that are the
most productive. The stock is then easily overfished. Other fishing regulations adopted
by the fishers, such as closed seasons, closed areas, limiting mesh size and numbers of
gill nets, and minimum catch size, were not enough to reduce competition among the
fishers. The pool account system effectively solved the problem. Once all the fishers
started getting an equal share, there was no reason for them to compete. This turned
out to be beneficial for the sustainability of the stock as well.
Less Successful FCAs
Despite being known as the oldest and the most successful co-management
systems in the world (Lim, Matsuda, and Shigemi, 1995; Weinstein, 2000), some of the
Japanese FCAs have experienced problems and conflicts among their members. The most
outstanding problems and conflict among members are from seven FCAs studied by19
Matsuda and Kaneda (1992). All the fisheries in these FCAs harvest highly variable
species such as sardine, mackerel, and squid. Most of the conflicts among the fishers are
about fishing gear and territory. Some were able to resolve the conflicts by specifying
fishing area with regard to the type of fishing gear and by clearly specifying fishing rights
granted to the fishers in each prefecture within the same FCAs. These FCAs are the
Kyiroku-to island, the Ariake sea, the Suo-Nada, and Hachinohe, and the Tone Estuary.
The fisheries in kyuroku-to island are for mackerel and abalone, while the Ariake fishery
is shellfish farming and the Hachinohe fishing is for squid and mackerel and the Tone
Estuary fisheries are for mackerel. Matsuda and Kaneda did not specify the type of
fishery for the Suo-Nada.
The first two FCAs have boundary conflicts between two prefectures. The
problem in the Suô-Nada is conflict among three prefectures that have different interests
in fishing and socio-economic backgrounds. The conflict in the Hachinohe and the Tone
Estuary is a gear conflict between purse seine fishers and fishers angling for mackerel.
Clarifying fishing rights, including specifying fishing areas for the prefectures, have
settled the conflicts in all four cases.
However, some of the seven FCAs experienced long-term conflicts among their
fishers, in spite of attempts to specify fishing rights. These FCAs are the Sukuma Bay
and the Hachinohe. Because of greater availability of information and the prospect of
evidence that fish stock characteristics may influence fishers' cooperation, I provide more
details for these two cases than I have done on the first four cases. One FCA conflict that
I will not describe in detail is the Essa Strait. This case of conflict, which differs from the
other six cases in the seriousness of the conflicts between trawl fishers and the fishers20
who use traditional gear such as angling and long line, has never been solved. In addition,
Matsuda and Kaneda provide no information on the fish species involved and there are
not enough details to pinpoint evidence of the influence of biological parameters on
fishers' cooperation.
The Sukuma Bay FCA.The outstanding fishery in this area is for sardine, which
is shared between the Ehime and Kochi prefectures. Incidents between the two
prefectures date back to the Edo Period. The conflict became more serious and occurred
more often after the transfer of fishing rights for four islands in the bay from the Köchi
prefecture to the Ehime prefecture in 1971. As a result, the Ehime fishers had to obtain
fishing licenses to fish in the Bay and the arrangement of fees for fishing became a
problem between the two prefectures. The license basically specifies the fishing area in
which the Ehime fishers are allowed to fish. The persistent conflict was made worse by
the introduction of purse seine fishing for sardine and the use of trawls by the Ehime
fishers, while the KOchi fishers still used traditional fishing gear, such as angling, long
line and set net.
There were several attempts to resolve the conflict, including several agreements
on the terms of fishing. Following each agreement a new incident occurred of illegal
fishing by the Ehime fishers in prohibited areas. Most of those agreements were aimed at
adjusting and redefining the fishing rights, especially the right for fishing territory.
Finally, a more effective agreement was reached in 1969, which resulted in fewer
problems during 1969 to 1977. Several reasons underlay this effective agreement: (1) an
administrative effort by both prefectures to improve monitoring by increasing the number
of coast guard boats and by promoting enforcement education among fishers; (2) a shift21
of the purse seine fishing ground from Sukuma Bay to Ehime waters, following
ecological changes; (3) a change from a rate wage to a fixed rate; and (4) good
communication on license renewal. However, the Ehime fishers illegally fished again in
1977. In 1978 the Ehime fishers canceled all their fishing rights.
The Hachinohe FCA.The problem in the Hachinohe FCA has been described as
the squid-mackerel incident. The problem is conflict between squid anglers and mackerel
purse seiners. An agreement was reached in 1966 with the introduction of a restricted
area and season for purse seine. In 1968, the squid landings started decreasing. The
decline of squid drove the price higher, which encouraged seiners to illegally fish for
squid and caused a new conflict between the anglers and purse seiners. The conflict was
solved in 1969 with an agreement to increase flexibility on the restricted fishing area and
to allow only local purse seiners to fish from November 16 to December 31.
The last conflict between the two parties took place in 1970 because of higher
competition on the same fishing ground and the illegal fishing for squid by the purse
seiners. Revision of the last agreement focused on the issue of distance between vessel
and gear operations, adjustments on production, and prevention of illegal fishing of
squid. Since the last agreement, few conflicts have been reported.
Comparison of the More and the Less Successful FCAs
When comparing the more and less successful Japanese FCAs, the most striking
difference between the two groups is whether they have flexible and adjustable
regulations. Most of the successful cases actually adjust their management regulations in
response to the biology of fish stocks so as to promote stock sustainability. An example22
of an FCA that has adjustable and flexible regulations is the Katsuura FCA, a lobster
fishery. Because lobsters do not migrate and are sedentary species, they are easily caught
and can be overexploited in a short period of time. Catch per unit effort for lobster at the
beginning of the season is much higher than later in the season (Katsuura Fishermen's
Cooperative Association, 1992; Wilson, 1994). As the fishing continues, the stock rapidly
and drastically declines. The fishers who happen to locate a good spot ahead of the others
will have more of a chance to make a good catch. Consequently, there is high
competition even during bad weather that causes accidents. Limited entry and the
profit-sharing pool accounting system are the two main management measures that the
Katsuura FCA adopts and adjusts in an attempt to reduce the problems of competition
among members and overfishing.
Unlike limited entry programs in many fisheries that attempt to control fishing
effort by limiting the numbers of fishers, boats, or fishing gear (Sissenwine and Kirkley,
1982; Anderson, 1994; Wilson, 1994), the Katsuura FCA's limited entry program
specifies details about the fishing grounds and which fishers can fish on each fishing
ground. The lobster fishers established three classes of fishing grounds: fair; good; and
excellent fishing grounds, each of which is subjected to different levels of restrictive
access. Only the fishers who have been members for more than seven years can fish in
the excellent fishing grounds. Those who have been members for five to seven years can
fish anywhere except the excellent fishing grounds.
In addition to limited entry, the profit-sharing pool accounting system helps
promote successful management by increasing fairness among the members. The fishers
get their shares equitably. The profit-sharing pooi accounting system is normally applied23
in the excellent and good fishing grounds for a certain period. The adjustment to the
profit-sharing system conforms to the nature of lobsters. The excellent and good fishing
grounds are opened for a short period of time and the lobsters are fished down until their
abundance is the same as in other fishing grounds. Once all the fishing grounds have
about the same lobster abundance, all the fishers have equal rights to fish where they
want. After all fishing grounds are opened for everyone, some fishers leave the lobster
fishery for other fisheries because lobster fishing is their part time job. In this maimer,
competition, especially in the excellent fishing grounds, and excessive fishing effort are
reduced. The adjusted limited entry program serves the lobster fishery as a management
tool in conserving the stock, while the profit-sharing pool accounting system serves the
fishery as a management tool that brings equity to the system.
In contrast to the more successful FCAs, regulations in the less successful FCAs
are based solidly on territorial fishing rights. The characteristics and nature of fish stocks
were not taken into consideration as a rationale for adjusting the management programs.
Despite the fact that both of the less successful cases, the Sukuma Bay FCA and the
Hachinohe FCA, had well-specified fishing areas and fishing rights, conflict among the
fishers and illegal fishing still existed. In addition, as mentioned by Lim, Matsuda, and
Shigemi (1995), the Japanese place high cultural value on compliance and conflict
avoidance. The fishers in the less successful FCAs should not differ in their cultural
values from the fishers in the other successful FCAs. Well-specified fishing rights and
compliance and conflict avoidance behaviors are two of the key factors to successful
co-management, which the Sukuma Bay FCA and the Hachinohe FCA did not appear to
lack. There should be some driving factor that provides an incentive for the fishers to24
illegally fish. The fishers might see the high variability of stocks, such as squid, sardine,
and mackerel, as an excuse for illegal fishing. Declines in the population of small pelagic
shoals like sardine and mackerel are hard to blame on overfishing because these stocks
are susceptible to environmental changes (Csirke, 1988). Another source of variability in
fish stocks that has been widely discussed is variability in recruitment, which is known to
be the main source of uncertainty in fisheries management (Sissenwine, 1984b). It has
been recognized that abundant pelagic species fluctuate over time due to high mortality
during the larval stage. Therefore, fluctuation and depletion of fish stocks appears to
result from natural causes rather than fishing (Bakun and Csirke, 1988; Sissenwine,
1984b; Wilson, 1994). The fishers may realize this about the nature of the stocks and take
a chance on being caught, while fishing illegally.
In principle, limited entry or license limitation aims to control fishing effort so
that the harvest and growth are balanced and the harvest is sustainable (Anderson, 1994;
Gimbel, 1994; Sissenwine and Kirkley, 1982; Wilson, 1994). The primary concern of
limited entry is economic efficiency in allocating resources because of its potential for
dealing with the problems of open access fisheries, dissipating economic rent and
overfishing. Because no individuals own common pool resources, they can exploit the
resources as much as they want (Flardin, 1968). Economically, the individuals continue to
exploit the resource until economic rent is dissipated and the profit from exploiting
becomes zero. Limited entry controls fishing effort by limiting the number of fishers,
boats, or fishing gear. Therefore, it prevents the build up of excess fishing effort, which
dissipates economic rent. Consequently, limited entry contributes a side benefit of
preventing overexploitation of the resources.25
Despite its advantage for fisheries management, limited entry has a drawback.
Practically, it is very difficult to control fishing effort because limiting the numbers of
boats, fishing gear, or fishers does not control fishing effort if the fishers can increase
their efficiency. Limited entry alone encourages fishers to invest in higher efficiency
boats and gear, which also increases fishing costs (Scott, 1989). Moreover, by limiting
the numbers of fishers, fisheries managers need to make serious decisions regarding who
should be allowed to participate in the fisheries. Excluding some fishers accordingly
initiates social problems. The fishers who are excluded feel unfairly treated by being
denied the opportunity to gain benefits from the resources. In particular, fishers whose
families have been fishing for generations would not prefer limited entry, especially if the
fishery is labor intensive (Kahn, 1995). These fishers are unlikely to be profit
maximizers. They have concerns that take precedence over maximizing profits, such as
maximizing income, the desire to maintain their families' traditional fishing career and
receiving fair treatment from fishing organizations. The fishers may be concerned about
their incomes rather than the profits that they potentially gain from fishing. Being able to
participate in fishing activities is also important to the fishers, especially those fishers
whose families have a long histories of fishing that have been passed on for generations.
Additionally, the fishers may feel unfairly treated by being denied the opportunity to gain
benefits from the resource that they consider belongs to them. The down side of limited
entry is entirely unacceptable and causes conflict in fishing societies.
A good example is the incidence of illegal fishing in the Hachinohe FCA. The
mackerel fishers who illegally fished for squid may have felt they were unfairly excluded.
With the attraction of high squid price and higher efficiency fishing gear, theiropportunistic behavior emerged. A compromise was reached when the authorities put less
restrictions on the fishing area and allowed the local purse seines to fish in some axeas.
Another interesting piece of evidence is the problem of declining membership in
the successful Nomaike FCA. The number of members in Nomaike has been declining
through time (Lim, Matsuda, and Shigemi, 1995). Rather than attempt to find successors,
the fishers encourage their children to get other jobs because they can foresee the
uncertainty in the fishing business as the fish stocks continue to decline. This evidence
shows that the biological characteristics of the fish stocks influence the fishers' decision
to join the cooperatives. The Nomaike FCA is not the only FCA that has faced the
problem of a lack of successors. Other FCAs, such as FCAs in Mugi city, Sukuma Bay of
Shizuoka prefecture, have also faced the same problem.
GAME THEORY
DEFINITION
Game theory has been applied to the study of conflicts that arise in many fields
including management science. The main and original development was for the study of
conflict behavior in economics. Game theory uses mathematics to describe strategic
behavior arising from conflicts among individuals (Luce and Raiffa, 1957; Rapoport,
1974; Rasmusen, 1989; Mesterton-Gibbons, 1992). It also proposes solutions for such
conflicts. Strategic behavior refers to decision-making actions by an individual that
reflect not only the individual's preferences to alternative choices but also to the
anticipated decisions of other individuals. An individual's decisions affect the decisions27
of others. A conflict in game theory generally has four elements: (1) a set of individuals
or decision makers, called players; (2) a set of strategies available to each player, which
describe how players can play the game from start to finish; (3) a set of outcomes, each of
which is the result of particular strategic choices made by the players during a given play
of the game; and (4) a set of payoffs accorded to each player for each of the possible
outcomes.
Game theory analysis has two main components, a description and a solution of a
game (Shubik, 1982). The description of a game explains in mathematical terms the type
of game and its rules. It incorporates all aspects of the game into a mathematical model.
The solution is related to the outcome of a game, which is a combination of the players'
best strategies.
BACKGROUND
Von Neumann first developed game theory, originally called the mathematical
theory of games of strategy, in many phases in 1928 and 1940-1941 (Von Neumann and
Morgenstern, 1964). The purpose was to understand and describe interactive decision
making in economics. In a strategic situation, an individual's decision does not depend
solely on his own preference, but also on the anticipated decisions of other individuals.
For example, a buyer and a seller negotiate a reasonable price by reacting to each other's
responses. However, this interactive behavior, an important economic factor, is very
difficult to analyze and is not easily measured. This difficulty might lead one to believe
that mathematics should not be used in studying economic phenomena. However,
Von Neumann and Morgenstern argued that the failure of mathematics in economics was28
mainly due to unclear specification of the problems, which consequently made the
mathematics difficult and nonsensical. They developed game theory as a mathematical
tool to understand interactive behavior in a market situation.
Generally, the basic application of game theoiy is to find out what might happen
given the assumption that players try to maximize their payoffs (Rasmusen, 1989). Game
theorists construct a game by assigning payoffs, strategy sets, and rules for the game.
They then find an equilibrium solution and the outcome of the game. The solution is a
strategy profile that suggests what the players will do or what strategies the players
should pick in order to maximize their payoffs. The outcome of the game consists of a set
of elements associated with the equilibrium solution. The game theorist might be
interested in the set of payoffs or any of the values consequently obtained from the
players' actions or choices that the players make.
CLASSIFICATION OF GAMES
Game classification schema are dependent upon the questions of interest to the
classifier. Different questions of the same game may require a different classification
schema.
A traditional game classification is cooperative versus non-cooperative
(Mesterton-Gibbons, 1992). This classification is based upon whether players in a game
can communicate with each other or commit to promoting joint benefits, in which case
the game is said to be cooperative (Schotter and Schwödiauer, 1980; Shubik, 1982;
Rasmusen, 1989). On the other hand, a game is said to be non-cooperative if the players
cannot communicate or make binding agreements.29
Games can also be classified by the number of the players in a game (Rapoport,
1974). For example, a game with two players is called a 2-person game. An n-person
game is one in which the number of the players is n.
Another important aspect of game theory is information, such as what players
know about each other and the structure of the game. If the game encompasses more than
one move, players have the opportunity to observe and gain information about the other
players. The information can then be used to make decisions. In this environment,
information becomes important to the players. The type and amount of information
varies. Accordingly, game theorists classify games based upon the structure and details of
the information available: extensive form versus strategic (or normal) form
(Mesterton-Gibbons, 1992; Rasmusen, 1989, Shubik, 1982).
The extensive form game is concerned with the details of the information, i.e. the
sequence of moves (when and who can move), what the players know about the game,
the restrictions on specific moves, states of the game, and all possible information for
each state. Examples of extensive form games are board games like checkers and
backgammon where the rules of the game specify the sequence of moves, possible moves
for each state of the game, and the conditions for when the game ends.
In the strategic form the focus is on calculating all possible strategies of the game
and the corresponding payoffs to each strategy, other details are omitted (Shubik, 1982;
Rasmusen, 1989). The game is reduced to a payoff matrix.30
GAME THEORYAND FISHERIES MANA GEMENT
The theory of games has been applied as a tool for modeling conflict situations in
various fields, but mainly in economics. However, in recent years game theory has
increasingly played an important role in other fields including political science, social
science, and operations research (Shubik, 1982). It also has been applied extensively in
the management sciences, such as the management of common pooi resources.
In the field of common pool resources there have been many studies that have
attempted to describe participants' behavior in cooperative organizations in the context of
game theory (Ostrom, 1990). Most of the studies have viewed the problem of cooperative
behavior in the context of the prisoner's dilemma, the decision-making process of two
prisoners who balance options and pay-offs. For instance, Axeirod (1980) investigates the
conditions under which cooperation will emerge in a world of egoists without central
authority. He employs the iterated prisoner's dilemma to analyze how an individual who
is pursuing his/her own interest will act towards common resources. In his analysis, he
allows only two individuals to interact with each other at a time. He concludes that
cooperation could emerge if an individual sees that he/she will have to interact with
others in the future.
In fisheries management game theory has been applied particularly in the study of
transboundary fishery resources. The expansion of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) in
the mid 1 970s gave rise to joint ownership of fisheries resources for those fish stocks that
straddle the EEZ boundaries of two or more nations. An example is the joint ownership
of the cod stock between Iceland and the United Kingdom (Munro, G. 1979; Levhari and
Mirman 1980). Economists and applied mathematicians have studied and analyzed joint31
ownership situations to look for solutions to these kinds of conflicts (Munro, 1990). The
analyses are commonly approached in the framework of a bioeconomic fishery model in
addition to concepts applied from game theory. For example, Levhari and Mirman (1980)
applied differential game theory to analyze the interaction between two countries that
exploit a common a fish stock. Differential game theory is a branch of game theory that
links control theory and game theory (Shubik, 1982). Control theory deals with the
dynamic behavior of a system in a continuous time framework. In the study of Levhari
and Mirman (1980) the dynamic system is the fish stock, while the strategic aspect is the
interaction between the two countries who compete for the fish. They solved for the
strategic behavior of the two countries using the concept of the Coumot-Nash
equilibrium, which for their model means that each country selects its harvest rate so that
it maximizes the present value of the flow of future profits. Levhari and Mirman
concluded that the solution for the conflict in the non-cooperative game, where the two
counties do not communicate, resulted in stock extinction. In contrast, they found that
under a cooperative game setting, where the two countries communicate and make
binding agreements on cooperation, the stock is likely to thrive.
Lewis and Cowens (1982) applied the theory of repeated games (or supergames)
to investigate the sustainability of cooperative arrangements among fishers. A supergame
is a class of dynamic game that changes sequentially over time. The supergame focuses
on infinitely repeated plays of the same game, i.e., the players make the same decision
repeatedly in the same situation (Rasmusen, 1989; Shubik, 1982). In addition, an action
in the repeated game is independent of the previous actions of any player. The model
developed by Lewis and Cowens differs from the standard repeated game at this point.32
The previous actions of players (fishers) affect the fish stock, which in turn affects the
current decisions of the players. From their study, Lewis and Cowens found that when the
number of fishers increases, the incentive for individuals to cooperate increases. In
addition, they showed that the scarcer the resources, the higher the degree of cooperation
among the players.
Munro (1990) applied a bioeconomic model of a fishery, together with game
theory, in an investigation of conflicts arising from management of a transboundary
resource. The fishery model was based upon the Schaefer model for the biological
productivity of the fish stock. The game aspect to the model was two countries who had
joint ownership of the fish stock. Each country attempts to harvest the stock to maximize
profits, but because the two countries share the fish stock, harvesting by one influences
how the other decides to control its own harvest. The strategic interaction can be
described mathematically as a game. Mtmro then set the strategic interaction between the
two countries in the framework of a non-cooperative game and a cooperative game. He
found that in the non-cooperative setting, the two countries do not communicate and
suffer worse economic consequences compared to those experienced under the
cooperative setting.33
III. METHODS: ANALYICAL FRAMEWORK
I will apply game theory to explore the stability of cooperative behavior in a
cooperative fishing organization in which the members are granted shares of an annual
harvest quota. Figure 1 shows the general analytical framework. I use economic concepts
and population dynamics models to assign the payoffs that are the basic elements for the
game. I apply game theory to capture the strategic situation arising from the different
payoffs and perceptions about the fish resources. The strategic situation can be described
in terms of a decision matrix, which I call the "fishery game". Then, I introduce the
concept of mixed strategies and apply it to the fishery game in order to solve for the
equilibrium outcomes of the game. In this section, I first explain details of the framework
of the fishery game. Subsequently, I explain all the crucial concepts applied in
developing the fishery game.
THE FRAMEWORK OF THE FISHERY GAME
The aim of this analysis is to investigate whether certain biological characteristics
of a fish stock have an influence on the fishers' decision to cooperate and catch only their
agreed shares of a harvest quota. The biological characteristics for the fish stock are
modeled using two parameters, the intrinsic growth rate (r) and the stock size. If a fish
stock has a high value of r it implies that the stock grows fast and I assume that it is also
likely to be highly productive and variable (Gulland, 1983; Myers, et al, 1997). The
fishers may decide to cooperate or not based on the biological status of the fish stock.
For simplicity, I assume the two fishers are members of a fishing cooperative
organization that grants its members shares of an annual harvest quota. I assume further34
that both fishers are homogeneous in their fishing operationsoperating with the same
size fishing boat and the same type of fishing gear and thus having identical fishing
power. Also, the two fishers have similar fishing costs and experience the same market
price. In contrast to studies that applied differential games to analyze cooperation in a
fishery, I analyze the strategic situation in a discrete time framework.
Figure 1. Analytical Framework for the Fishery Game
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There are two kinds of interactions and reactions among the organization's
members. I start with the premise that the two fishers, who initially are members of the
cooperative organization, are willing to cooperate and limit their harvest to their allocated
portion of the harvest quota. Otherwise, they would never have joined the organization. I
then assume that during the fishing season the fishers are unsure about the condition of
the fish stock and whether other fishers will continue to cooperate. They may decide to
cheat and catch more than their share of the harvest quota.
After applying game theory to a model for biomass and fishery dynamics to
mimic all crucial components for the fishery game, I solve for the equilibrium outcome of
the game. The outcome of the game in this analysis is the probability that both fishers
continue to cooperate and catch only their own shares of the harvest quota. I then analyze
how the biological factors in the game influence the fishers' decision to cooperate. When
the fishers are all cooperative they harvest only the shares allocated to them by the
organization. So, the share for each fisher is the total quota divided by the number of
fishers.
Despite their homogeneity and commitment to the fishing cooperative, the fishers
differ in their perceptions about the fish stock and in their attitudes toward risk, which
results in different tendencies to cooperate. From an economic perspective, risk aversion
refers to a person who prefers less variable rewards (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1992).
Someone who is risk averse prefers a reward with high certainty to one with less
certainty, even though the reward is less valuable. In contrast, a risk-prone person prefers
highly valuable rewards despite high variability of the rewards. For example, a risk
averse person would rather invest his money in a saving account than in the stock market36
because he can gain a more certain rate of return from the bank, even though with a lower
rate when compared to the gain from the stock market. A risk prone person will rather do
the opposite. Accordingly, the two fishers have different perceptions of and reactions to
potential change in the fish stock. The fisher who is risk adverse would want to fish in a
conservative manner so as to ensure that the stock will be productive through time.
Meanwhile, the fisher who is risk prone would be willing to gamble on future
productivity and harvest as much as possible at the present. Additionally, if the stock has
large intrinsic growth rate (r), the risk prone fisher might perceive that the stock, by its
nature, is fast growing, so that the stock is highly productive and would rapidly recover
from any overharvesting. These fishers might be willing to gamble that the stock growth
is sufficiently fast that they could catch more than their share and nobody would know it.
Because the stock grows fast, their overharvesting would not result in any apparent
depletion of the stock in the future.
Both fishers know each other's attitudes towards risk. During the fishing season,
both fishers are unsure about each other's decision regarding the harvest. The fishers may
communicate, but in practice, they will not tell anybody if they decide to cheat and catch
more than their portion of the harvest quota. Therefore, it is more reasonable to assume
that communication does not take place. As a consequence, the commitment to cooperate
may not be adhered to. Without communication and commitment the fishery game cannot
be considered a cooperative game. Solution concepts other than the bargaining concept
used in cooperative games need to be introduced to solve the fishery game.
Because one fisher does not know whether the other will continue to cooperate or
not, the fishers do not know each other's payoffs. To solve for the equilibrium outcome37
of the game, given that the players' payoffs are unknown, I need to incorporate mixed
strategies into the game. The mixed strategy approach applies probability distributions
over each player's pure strategies so that all possible payoffs can be calculated for each
player corresponding to the strategies that the players would select. With the possible
payoffs, the game is then solvable.
MIXED STRATEGIES
A mixed strategy is a probability distribution assigned to the set of pure strategies
for a player. For example, if a player has a set of pure strategies that has two elements,
{cooperative, non-cooperative}, a mixed strategy over this pure strategy set would be
{pr(cooperative, 1 -pr(cooperative) }. Basically, the mixed strategy indicates the
likelihood that the player will play each pure strategy. The mixed strategy of {0.3, 0.7 }
means that in repeated trials of the game the player is likely to play the cooperative
strategy with a probability of 0.3 and to play the non-cooperative strategy with a
probability of 0.7. The outcome of the game is the payoff combination from each player
corresponding to the mixed strategies equilibrium. The mixed strategies equilibrium is
the mixed strategies combination selected by the two players. It should be noted that the
payoffs in the mixed strategies are average values averaged over a large number of trials
of the game, whereas the payoffs obtained from a game with a pure strategy equilibrium
are certain. The pure strategy equilibrium refers to the combination of the pure strategies
selected by the players that result in the maximum payoffs for all players.
Mixed strategies are usually applied to induce an equilibrium solution in a game
that has no pure strategy equilibrium (Luce and Raiffa, 1957; Dresher, 1961; Rasmusen,38
1989; Gibbons, 1992). By applying a mixed strategy to a game, we basically expand the
strategy set of a player. By incorporating a probability distribution over the set of pure
strategies, the payoffs corresponding to each pure strategy can consequently be regarded
as expectations, which are continuous. Hence, the payoffs are expanded for each pure
strategy according to the mixing probability. In this manner, when one player pursues a
mixed strategy, the other player will always find a mixed strategy that will be his/her best
response. An equilibrium finally exists in the game.
Even though the mixed strategies concept is usually focused on games that have
no pure strategy equilibrium, it can also be applied to games with pure strategy equilibria.
Regardless of the presence of a pure strategy equilibrium, a player may have reasons to
play strategies other than the strategy that produces the equilibrium. In particular, the
player may decide to deviate from the equilibrium strategy if he/she feels that his/her
opponent might also deviate from the equilibrium strategy. From the player's point of
view, mixed strategies provide a better defense against his/her opponent. When one
player plays a pure strategy randomly, his/her payoff function will be unpredictable for
his/her opponents and it will be hard for the opponent to respond in such a way that the
outcome of the game is in the opponent's favor. For example, suppose a pitcher in a
baseball game has two choices for throwing a ball, fast ball or curve ball. If the pitcher
chooses to play each strategy randomly, it will be hard for his/her opponent to anticipate
the pitches and choose the best swing to counter the pitcher's mixed pitches.39
EQUILIBRIUM IN MIXED STRATEGIES
Underlying the concept of an equilibrium in mixed strategies is the idea that the
players try to hide their selected strategy from each other. When a game does not have a
pure strategy equilibrium none of available strategies is uniquely best for all the players.
The best that a player could do is to anticipate what strategy his opponent will select or to
hide his strategy from his opponent. Von Neumann and Morgenstern(1964)suggest that
the rational way for a player to hide his strategy is to play equal odds for all strategies.
Once the player decides to play each strategy with equal chance, no matter which strategy
his opponent selects, the player's probability of winning or losing will be the same. Also,
his expected payoffs from playing the two strategies are the same. This concept has been
applied as a rule for fmding an equilibrium in a game with mixed strategies--a player
should be indifferent to the available strategies. In practice, one assumes that a player
expects that his opponent will try to hide his strategy by playing each option with equal
odds. The player then tries to figure out what strategy he can choose as the best response
to his opponent's random play. The first thing that the player would do is to assign a
probability distribution over the opponent's strategy set. He then equates all possible
payoffs from the strategies of the opponent.
Consider, for example, the matrix game illustrated in Table 1. In the first column
are the pure strategies available to player A, while in the first row are the pure strategies
available to player B. The numbers in the parentheses in each cell represent the payoff
combinations corresponding to the strategies selected by both players. The first number
in each set of parentheses is the payoff for player A, while the second one is the payoff
for player B. For example, the payoff combination (-1, 3) represents the payoff ofi for40
player A when he plays the cooperative strategy, and the payoff of 3 for player B when
he plays the non-cooperative strategy. Notice that neither playerhasa best response tohis
opponent. Neither player will knowingly choose the strategy combination
(non-cooperative, non-cooperative) because it yields zero payoffs for both players. Also,
neither player would prefer the strategy combination (non-cooperative, cooperative)
because it would not give the players the highest payoffs. Player A would prefer the
cooperative strategy provided player B also chose the cooperative strategy because it
gives A the highest payoff. Likewise, player B would prefer the non-cooperative strategy
when player A chose the cooperative strategy. Both players cannot simultaneously have
their best payoff from the strategy preferred by their opponent. Thegame has no pure
strategy equilibrium.
Table 1. A matrix game that has no equilibrium solution
Player A
Player B
Cooperative Non-Cooperative
Cooperative (3, 2) (-1, 3)
Non-cooperative (-1, 1) (0, 0)
We can induce an equilibrium by assuming that each player assigns probability
distributions to his opponent's strategy set. Suppose that player A chooses cooperative
and non-cooperative strategies with probabilityPAandi-PArespectively (Table 2).41
Fisher B chooses cooperative and non-cooperative strategies with probability ofPBand 1-
PBrespectively. The expected payoffs for A are:
ICA (PA = 1, PB) = (pB)*(3) +(lpa)*(l)=4PB1 (5)
7tA (PA = 0, PB)= (pB)*(l) + (lp)*(0) =-PB (6)
At the mixed strategy equilibrium fisher A is indifferent between the expected payoffs
from his choice of strategy. Therefore, setting equation(5)equal to equation(6)we get
= -PB;
.PB1/S
Table2.Introducing probability distributions
Player A
Player B
Cooperative Non-Cooperative
Cooperative (3, 2) (-1, 3)
Non-cooperative (-1, 1) (0, 0)
PB i-PB
Likewise, the expected payoffs for fisher B are:
PA
i-PA
ICB(PA,PBl)(2)*(PA)+(l)*(l.pA)pA+l (7)
7tB (pA,B = 0) =(3)*(pA) + (0)*(lpA)= 3PA. (8)42
PAl =
Therefore, the mixed strategy equilibrium outcome is (pA=i/2, p=i/5) implying a 50%
chance that fisher A will be cooperative and a 20% chance that fisher B will be
cooperative. One might be interested in the equilibrium payoffs. From these probabilities
that produce the mixed strategy equilibrium we could calculate the equilibrium payoffs
by substituting PA andPBin equations (5) and (7) or (6) and (8), which yields the payoff
combination (1.5, -0.2)
GENERAL INTERPRETATION OF MIXED STRATEGIES
The meaning of mixed strategies depends on how one interprets the probability
distribution (Luce and Raiffa, 1957). In general, a mixed strategy defines the likelihood
that a player would play each pure strategy in a pure strategy set. For example, a mixed
strategy of {0.3, 0.7} for a player that has two pure strategies {cooperative and non-
cooperative} suggests that the player would play the cooperative strategy with probability
of 0.3 and the non-cooperative strategy with probability of 0.7.
More specifically, we can view a mixed strategy as measuring one player's
uncertainty about what the other players will do (Gibbons, 1992; Brandenburger, 1992).
Suppose a game with players A and B has a pure strategy set of {cooperative,
non-cooperative}. The mixed strategy {0.3, 0.7} for player A implies that player B
believes that player A would play the cooperative and non-cooperative strategy with
probability 0.3 and 0.7 respectively. Given this belief, player B needs to find his/her
mixed strategy that is the best response to player A's mixed strategy.43
PROBLEMS IN INTERPRETING MIXED STRATEGIES
Most modelers and economists generally avoid applying mixed strategies to their
models (Luce and Raiffa, 1957; Rasmusen, 1989; and Brandenburger, 1992). Interpreting
mixed strategies is always problematic. It contradicts the fact that human players in a
game naturally have no strict incentive to act randomly, nor do they normally randomize
when making decisions. Moreover, mixed strategy equilibria are unstable, because even
if one player uses an equilibrium strategy it is unnecessary for their opponent to respond
with an equilibrium strategy.
Despite these problems of interpretation, the mixed strategies approach is a useful
tool because of its applicability to certain situations where other types of solutions cannot
be found. Examples are the situations where there is no pure strategy equilibrium for the
game and where all players do not know what strategies their opponents will play. The
mixed strategy approach can introduce an equilibrium for games having no pure strategy
equilibrium
To find an equilibrium of a game, game theorists need to classify the type of the
game. Consequently, game theorists apply a solution concept according to the type of
game to solve for the equilibrium, for example, applying the bargaining concept to find
an equilibrium of a cooperative game. For a pure strategy game where an equilibrium of
the game is possible to find, we focus on the players' communications. Depending on
whether the players are allowed to communicate with one another, a game can be
classified as either a cooperative or non-cooperative game. As opposed to a
non-cooperative game, in which the players are not allowed to communicate, a
cooperative game is a game where the players are allowed to communicate and make44
binding agreements. However, a game may be classified neither as a cooperative nor a
non-cooperative game with regard to some situations underlying the game. An example is
the fishery game, in which the players do not know their opponents' strategies and also
do not communicate with one another. Mixed strategies can be applied to solve for an
equilibrium of the game.
BIOMASS DYNAMIC MODEL
The biomass dynamics model describes the biomass of a fish population at the
end of a time period in terms of the biomass of the stock at the start of the time period,
the natural growth rate of the stock, and the harvest. The basic logistic growth model is
used to describe the growth increment in stock biomass, and the harvest or catch is
assumed to be proportional to effort and the initial stock size (Hilbom and Walters, 1992;
King, 1995). Mathematically, the basic biomass dynamics model is described as follows:
B,+1=B,+r*B,*G_-!-')_H (1)
K)
Where B is the stock biomass at the start of interval t, K is the carrying capacity, r is
intrinsic growth rate, and H is total harvest during the time interval.
In this discrete time modeling framework the harvest is given by the standard
catch equation of fisheries (Gulland, 1983):
H=B* _F*[l_exp(_(F+M)*t)] (2) F+M45
where B is biomass at the beginning of the time period, F is the fishing mortality
coefficient, M is the natural mortality coefficient, t is the time interval, which is one
fishing season in this analysis.
Because the fishing season is short, I assume that natural mortality during the
fishing season is negligible compared to fishing mortality. The harvest equation
simplifies to:
H=B*[l_exp(_F)], (3)
I make the standard assumption that the instantaneous rate of fishing mortality is
proportional to the amount of fishing effort,
Fq*f (4)
where f is fishing effort, and q is the catchability coefficient. In this model fishing effort
measures the amount of fishing gear applied during the fishing operation. Therefore, the
harvest equation for this analysis is:
H=B*[1_exp(_q*f)] (5)ECONOMIC MODEL
fishing,
The economic components of the model are the revenues and costs produced by
2r=H1*P_c*f (6)
whereit1is profits for fisher i,H1is the harvest by fisher i, P is market price for fish, and
c is cost per unit of fishing effort. As is commonly done in fisheries economics, here I
assume that the fish price is constant and independent of the amount harvested and the
fishing costs are strictly proportional to the amount of fishing effort.
DISCOUNTING
Economists use the concept of discounting to determine the present value of
money or a commodity received in the future. It is normally assumed that a given amount
of money or commodity is worth more today than it is worth tomorrow (Hutter, 1996;
Prugh, 1995; Pearce and Turner, 1990). Receiving $100 today is worth more than getting
it in the future because we can put the $100 in the bank and earn interest.
How much the $100 in the future would be worth today depends on the discount
rate, the rate that a future value will be discounted. For example, given a 10% annual
discount rate, $100 received one year from today will be worth $90.47
If dr is the discount rate then the discount factor is 1/(1 +r)t, where t is the number
of time periods. Economists use the discount factor to convert a future value into its
present value using the general formula:
PV=FV
[(l+dry
where FV is a given future value, dr is the discount rate, and t is the number of time
periods. For example, given a 10% discount rate, $1,000 five years fromnow is worth
$620.92 today.
DISCOUNTING & NATURAL RESOUR CE AND ENVIRONMENTAL
ECONOMICS
Discounting is a concern in natural resource use because it influences the rate of
resource use and therefore may affect equity among generations (Lines, 1995; Hutter,
1996; Pearce and Turner, 1990). Discounting can make future generations worse off
because the future value of resources is discounted by the present generation. A positive
discount rate reflects a higher value of benefits in the present than in the future. Hence, it
generates an incentive to the present generation for consuming natural resources now.
The higher the discount rate the more rapidly resources will be depleted.
According to Pearce and Turner (1990), there are two reasons why the discount
rate is greater than zero, time preference and capital productivity. Time preference is
based on the idea that an individual prefers to have benefits now rather than later.
Uncertainty about the future strengthens the preference for present benefits. Capital48
productivity is based on the idea of investing in natural capital. Rather than consuming a
natural resource, which is considered as a natural asset, we wait to consume it later. This
allows the natural capital to grow so that it can produce more and contribute a higher
benefit in the future. In this sense, the future benefit is greater than the present one.
For evaluating natural resources, the choice of discount rate can be controversial.
In addition, the decision to assign a particular value for the discount rate is generally
influenced by politics. No matter whether the discount rate is high or low there are
always supporters and opponents on each side. For example, it is commonly argued that a
low discount rate discourages consumption and prevents natural resources from being
overexploited. With a low discount rate, it is worthwhile to delay harvest until the
resource has had a chance to grow and achieve more of its potential productivity.
Therefore, future benefits will outweigh the present benefits. Meanwhile, one could argue
that a low discount rate could lead to more business investment and greater use of natural
capital, if the interest rate is set in relation to the discount rate (Lines, 1995). At low
interest rates it is advantageous to borrow money from the bank for investment. In this
manner, more resources will be utilized and, consequently, natural resource depletion and
environmental damage are greater. In terms of natural and environmental management,
most conservative environmentalists and environmental economists prefer a low discount
rate.
DISCO UNTING AND GAME THEORY
Game theorists employ discounting generally with dynamic games, in which
players make a sequence of moves, such as in sequential bargaining games (Gibbons,1992). In the sequential game, which is played in discrete time steps, the players take
turns making a bargain at each time period until the game reaches equilibrium, when all
players accept each others' offers. It is assumed that players are impatient to have their
payoffs now rather than later. As the game goes on, each player's payoff is discounted
according to his or her degree of impatience. At the end of a period, the discounted
payoffs for the players can be represented as:
7tp = 8*
whereltpis the payoff for the present period,iLLis the payoff for the later period,is
discount factor and 0 < < 1.
DISCOUNTING AND THE FISHERY GAME
In contrast to the discounting employed in the dynamic game, I apply discounting
to represent the fishers' tendencies to cooperate. In the fishery game the fishers have to
decide between two strategies, being cooperative and harvesting only their share of the
quota versus being non-cooperative and harvesting more than their share. Given that a
fisher has a particular tendency to cooperate, it is reasonable that the fisher's tendency to
choose a non-cooperative strategy is just
Pr(non-cooperative) = 1Pr(cooperative).50
On a relative scale, if a fisher has a high predisposition to cooperate, then his
predisposition to be uncooperative should be low.
Furthermore, it seems reasonable that the fishers tendency to cooperate should be
related to the fisher's attitude towards risk and uncertainty about the fish stock, which is
characterized in this fishery game by the intrinsic growth rate of the stock ( r). I assume
that a high value of r implies a more productive and variable fish stock. The productivity
and variability of the stock, in turn, will encourage uncooperative fishers to gamble that
they could catch more than their shares because the stock would recover rapidly. Also,
the fishers may want to catch as much as they can rather than trading the high potential
present catch for the uncertain future. In contrast, the cooperative fishers would want to
catch conservatively to ensure the sustainability of the highly productive and variable
stock.
One would expect that the fishers with a greater tendency to gamble would be less
likely to cooperate because these fishers would perceive that their expected cooperative
benefits are smaller than the non-cooperative ones. Being cooperative in the context of
the fishery game means that fishers catch no more than their quota shares, whereas being
non-cooperative means the fishers catch more than their quota shares. When the profits
from fishing at the quota are less than the maximum possible profits, there are economic
incentives to be non-cooperative. However, because the abundance of a fish stock is
uncertain due to environmental changes and variation in the productivity of the fish stock,
the stock cannot sustain catches larger than the quota. Catching more than the quota
could result in overfishing and stock depletion. Those fishers who are less willing to risk51
stock depletion would be more cooperative. Meanwhile, those fishers who are more
willing to bear the risk would be less cooperative.
My purpose in applying the concept of discounting is not for discounting future
profits as normally practiced in economics, but for evaluating fishers' expected benefits
given their perceptions and tendencies to cooperate. The factor that I use in evaluating the
fishers' profits, given their tendencies to cooperate is
-
l+b *r
(8)
whereb1is the risk coefficient for fisher i and r is intrinsic growth rate. I assume that the
tendency to cooperate is inversely related to the intrinsic growth rate of the fish stock.
The greater the value ofthe higher the tendency for the fisher to cooperate and the
lower the tendency to be uncooperative. In contrast, as the value of b.*r increases, the
tendency to cooperate decreases. The term b*r is analogous to the discount rate in
standard economics and ö is analogous to the discount factor.
According to Mendelssohn (1981), a fish stock will be fished down to extinction
if the discount rate is higher than intrinsic growth rate of the stock. Given the basic
assumption in game theory that all players are rational, we should expect that the fishers
are rational and would not want to have the stock go extinct. Hence, the discount rate
(b*r) must be less than or equal to r, and the maximum value for the risk coefficientb1is
1. The lowest possible value for b1 is zeroin which case the fishers' discounted
cooperative benefit is exactly the same as the undiscounted cooperative benefit and the
fishers have the highest tendencies to cooperate.52
IV. METHODS: THE FISHERY GAME
I organize this chapter into three sections. The first section describes the problem
and defines the form of the fishery game and its elements. The second section sets up the
fisheries model and explains in detail the elements of the game, which are the payoffs and
the solution. The third section presents the method used to analyze the model. The aim of
the analysis is to examine the influence of biological parameters on fishers' cooperation
as shown by the outcomes of the game. Specifically, I investigate the general outcomes of
the game and then investigate the fishers' cooperation under the mixed strategy
outcomes.
PROBLEM SETTING
I assume that two fishers, A and B, are members of a fishing cooperative
organization and that a fisheries authority assigns to the cooperative an annual harvest
quota. The authority focuses on maintaining sustainable harvests from the fish resource
and assigns the quota based upon the fishing rate that will produce the estimated
maximum sustainable yield (MSY). The total quota Q is mathematically determined as:
Q=r*B/2
where B is the current stock size, and r is the intrinsic growth rate. Given that the stock
grows according to the logistic growth model and that the fishers always catch the quota,
the equilibrium stock size will be K12 and the annual harvest will be r*K14.53
At the formation of the cooperative organization, the two fishers are cooperative
and agree to fish up to their assigned quota, which is simply half of the total quota.
During a fishing season, one or both of the fishers may deliberately catch more than their
quota share and one or both of them may start doubting whether or not the other will
remain cooperative and catch only their quota share. Because each fisher's decision
appears to depend upon the other's, we can consider the situation a game.
In the context of game theory, when players in a game have to guess the other's
decision in order to make their own decision, we can view the game as having the normal
form with mixed strategies. The mixed strategy describes the probability that the player
would choose a particular strategy. Given a game withtwostrategies, being cooperative
versus being non-cooperative, if fisher A chooses to play mixed strategies it means that
he chooses to play each strategy randomly with a certain probability. For example, if
fisher A plays mixed strategies by playing the cooperative strategy with a probability of
0.3,then he plays the non-cooperative strategy with a probability of 0.7. In reference to a
two-person game, I represent the strategic interaction between the two fishers as a game
with the matrix form illustrated in Table3.
The 2x2-matrix represents the fishery game with two players, fisher A and fisher
B, both having two strategies to choose, between cooperative versus non-cooperative.
The termsPAandPBare the probabilities that fishers A and B will choose the cooperative
strategy. The termsICAandltBare the payoffs, the profits for fisher A and B. The first
subscript denotes the player's strategy, while the second one denotes his opponent's
strategy. For example, ltAncis the payoff for fisher A when he plays the non-cooperative
strategy, while his opponent, fisher B, plays the cooperative strategy.Table 3. Matrix for mixed strategies
Fisher A
Fisher B
Cooperative Non-Cooperative
Cooperative (7rAc, 7tBcc) (7tAcn, ltBnc)
Non-cooperative(n,lrBcn) 7tB)
PB '-PB
54
PA
'PA
The payoffs are the actual profits gained from fishing. However, how much the
profits from playing each strategy would be worth to the fishers depends on how the
fishers value them. I assume that the two fishers value the profits differently depending
on their tendencies to cooperate(ö1), which depend on their attitudes to uncertainty in the
fish stock. The benefits realized by player i for deciding to be cooperative are given by
= (10)
The realized benefits for deciding to be uncooperative are
=(l-6tm (11)
For simplicity, in the remainder of this thesis the notationitandwill refer to the
realized payoffs for fisher i for playing the cooperative and non-cooperative strategies
respectively.55
SETTING UP THE FISHERY GAME
In the previous section, the form of the fishery game was defined and represented
as a matrix (Table 3). The next task is to assign the payoffs for each strategy combination
in the matrix. The following section explains how to obtain the payoffs for each fisher
corresponding to each strategy combination. Then, I solve for the outcomes of the game
and also the realized payoffs from the outcomes.
ASSIGNING THE PA YOFFS
Strategy Combination (cooperative, cooperative)
Consider the strategy combination (cooperative, cooperative). Given the
assumption of a binding agreement and that the two fishers are homogeneous in fishing
power and fishing costs. It is obvious that the payoff for this strategy combination is the
benefit from the quota harvest assigned for each fisher, half of the total quota. The
realized payoff for this strategy is:
71icc=si[(*F_c*];
L(2)
(12)
where Q is the total quota, P is market price per unit of fish weight, c is the cost per unit
of fishing effort, andf1is fishing effort for fisher i.
To find the effort for each fisher, set the total catch equal to the quota,
r*BB*(l_exp(_q*f)), (13)
256
where B is the stock size at the beginning of the fishing period andfTis the total effort for
both fishers.
From (13) the total effort is
(
mi1
fT
q
Because each fisher has an equal share in the quota, each will exert half that amount of
effort during the fishing season effort
1\2)
fA=fB= (14)
2q
Finally, the realized profit for fisher i when he and his opponent are both cooperative
(ltkC)is
(_in1i-1i'11 [r*B*P
2)11 (15) 2r,ccS
L
2q
J]57
Strategy Combinations (non-cooperative, cooperative) and (cooperative, non-
cooperative)
The payoffs(it,ir) and(it, 7r),corresponding to the strategy combinations of
(cooperative, non-cooperative) and (non-cooperative, cooperative) respectively, represent
the case of one fisher cheating and catching more than the quota share, while the other is
cooperating and catching only the quota share. To assign payoffs for these strategy
combinations assume that one fisher harvests his quota share while the other fisher
harvests so as to maximize his profits.
In the short run the total costs of fishing are assumed to be a linear function of
effort (Figure 2). Doubling the fishing effort (i.e. spending twice as much time fishing or
doubling the units of fishing gear) will also double the costs of fishing. Meanwhile, total
revenue as a function of fishing effort first dramatically increases but then gradually
levels off and approaches a horizontal asymptote as the fish stock is depleted. The effort
level f-OA (Effort at Open Access) is the effort level at which the total fishing costs
equals the total revenue. The fishers make only normal profits at the effort level f-OA.
The effort levelfMPFis the effort level that will produce the maximum profit for the
fishery (MPF).
Using the short run catch and effort relationship, the effort that maximizes the
profit(fMpF)for the fishery can be calculated by equating marginal revenue with marginal
cost,
MR = MC58
Figure 2. Short-nm cost and revenue in a fishery
In standard economic analysis, marginal revenue is defined as the change in
revenue associated with a change in output. In the analysis here, marginal revenue is the
change in revenue associated a change in total fishing effort, which is an input. This
alternative approach is often used in fisheries economics (Cunningham, Dunn, and
Whitmarsh, 1985). The marginal revenue is
MR.ILq*p*B*exp(_q*f)Similarly, the marginal cost function is
MC==c
of
When the profit is maximized we have:
Therefore,
q*p*B*exp(_q*f)=
(c
mi
c q*p*B
JMPF
q
(16)
(17)
Assume that fisher B is the cooperative player and is trying only to catch his
quota share. His catch is
CB=ir*B
4
and the fishing effortfBneeded to take this catch must satisf' the catch equation
B1_fB(1_exp(_q*f,))ir*B
fFJ
(18)Hence,
r*fF
fB4(1_exp(_q*f
The realized cooperative profit for B when his opponent chooses the
non-cooperative strategy is
Bcn=8B[rBP_
r*f,F
4(lexp(q*f))Jj
In general terms, the profit for the fisher who is cooperative while his opponent is
non-cooperative can be written
(19)
2r1=8a[-_r*B*P_X_r*f,F C
4 4(1 exp(q*fF))JJ
(20)
Fisher A, who decides not to cooperate, knows the payoff function for
cooperation and knows the effort levelfMPFthat will yield the maximized profit.
Therefore, the most benefit that he could get from the fishery is the maximized profit less
the profit of fisher B who catches his quota share. As a result, the effort that fisher A
should employ is the effort levelfMPFminus the effort that fisher B employs61
fA=fF fil'
r*fF fF4(1x(q*f)) (21)
From the basic catch equation, the catch for fisher A is
CA =BIfA J(1_exp(_q*fF))
fF
CA=B1 fAJ(1_exp(_q*fF))
\ f
:.CA=B((1_exp(_q*fMpF))_J (22)
Because fisher A has chosen the non-cooperative strategy, his realized payoff is
r*fF
(23) Bnc
We can write, in general, that the non-cooperative profit for fisher i when his opponent is
cooperative is:62
=(iô exp(q*
fF ))lP r*fF cl(24)
4J
MPF
4(1exp( q*
fF ))J j
Strategy Combinations (non-cooperative, non-cooperative)
In contrast to the strategy (cooperative, cooperative), the strategy combination
(non-cooperative, non-cooperative) implies that there is no binding agreement to restrain
harvests and both fishers operate as if they are in an open access fishery. There are no
effective regulations that control fishing and the fishers harvest as much as they want.
Consequently, the realized payoffs for both fishers are the benefits gained from fishing at
the open access level, in which case, fishing revenue equals the total cost of fishing.
Therefore, both fishers will get only normal profits of zero.
SOL VING FOR THE PROBABILITY OF COOPERATION
To determine the mixed strategy solutions to the fishery game the strategy choices
by each player are assigned probabilities (Table 4). To solve for the probabilitiesPA, PB
let us first consider fisher A and solve for his/her probability of choosing each strategy.
Given values for the probabilitiesPBandi-PBto choose the strategies cooperative and
non-cooperative respectively, fisher A's payoff when he plays cooperatively is
AC(PA ="PB)=PB +(l_pB)*,rAC,l (25)Table 4. Fishing game matrix with the assigned payoffs
Fisher A
Fisher B
Cooperative Non-Cooperative
Cooperative (7rA, lcBcc) (irACfl, it)
Non-cooperative (7rM, ir) (0, 0)
PB i-PB
The payoff when fisher A plays non-cooperatively is
Afl(PAO,PB)_PBAflc+(lPB)Afln
- *PB Anc
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PA
i-PA
(26)
At the mixed strategy equilibrium fisher A is indifferent between the expected
payoffs from the two strategies. Thus, by setting equation (25) equal to equation (26) I
can calculate the value forPB,
PBAcc+(lPB)Acn PBAcn
Acn/
PB /(7rAflC + Acc)
(27)
Similarly, the realized payoff for fisher B when he plays cooperatively isB(PA'PB =l)=PA7t+(l_pA)*2rBcn (28)
and the realized payoff when he plays non-cooperatively is
B(PA'PB= 0) = PA*
Bcn+0PA)7TBflfl
- *
PA Bcn (29)
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When fisher B is indifferent between the payoffs from the two strategies, equation (28) is
equal to equation (29),
PA=Bcn/
/(2tBflC +Bcn Bcc)
(30)
Having determined values forPAandpBI can then calculate the realized profits
from each strategy combination. As can be seen from equations (27) and (30) derived
from the previous section, the probabilities of cooperationPAfor fisher A andPBfor
fisher B, are functions of the profits. The profits are derived from many parameters: r, B,
the fishers' tendencies to cooperate (&), fishing effort (fT), fish price (P), and fishing costs
(c). Because there are so many parameters in the model, it is difficult to investigate how
any given parameter actually influences the model output. In addition, the ranges of
values for some parameters have not been fully specified. Here, I manipulate the fishery65
model so as to specify ranges for all the parameters and to reduce the numbers of
parameters in the model.
SPECIFYING RANGES OF VALUES FOR THE PARAMETERS.
The value of r is limited to the range 0 <r <2. BecauseQ =r /2* B, when
r2 the quota exceeds the stock size. It is impossible for a fishery to exceed the
available stock, therefore r can not exceed 2.
The value of b1 (bA or bB) is limited to the range 0 <b1<1. The discount rate
(b1*r) must be less than or equal to r, therefore, the maximum value for the risk
coefficient b1 is 1. At b1's lowest value of zero, the fishers' discounted cooperative benefit
is the same as the undiscounted cooperative benefit.
In an unexploited fish stock one would expect the stock size to be approximately
equal to the carrying capacity and when there is fishing the stock size should be less than
the carrying capacity. We can eliminate one parameter by scaling the initial stock size B
by the carrying capacity K,
The new variable B' is a dimensionless quantity that should be in the range (0, 1).
After scaling by K, the fisheries model becomeswhere c=
K
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Specifying a New Parameter, rho (p)
(31)
(32)
(33)
To further reduce the number of parametersandsimplify the model I introduce a
new parameter, rho (p),67
q*]q*p*K
C' C
This allows me to eliminate two additional parameters. Furthermore, the new variable has
an economic interpretation. The term q*P*K is the profit per unit of fishing effort when
the stock is unfished andcis cost per unit of fishing effort. Therefore, rho is the ratio of
profits to costs when the stock is first subjected to fishing.
Scaling the payoffs in equations (31), (32), and (33) by P, we can rewrite those
payoffs as functions of rho:
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(36)68
Specifying a Range of Values for rho.
Because rho is the ratio of profits to costs when a fishery begins, realistic values
for rho must be greater than one or the stock would never be exploited, but there is no
theoretical upper bound. However, this thesis limits the value of rho to the range 2 to 20.
It is a range of profiticost ratios that is not unrealistic. The lower limit of this range is
sensible because it is just slightly larger than the theoretical lower bound. The upper limit
would mimic a highly profitable fishery. According to Pinkerton (1989), a profit/costs
ratio of 9:1 results in reasonable fisher satisfaction. Therefore, the profit/cost ratio of 20
is high enough to see the influence of rho on the outcomes of the game.
MODEL ANALYSIS
The focus of this thesis is to explore how fish stock size (B') and natural
productivity (r) influence the fishers' decision to cooperate. I conducted analyses of the
model to investigate the influence of these factors. There are two primary analyses, the
investigation of the influences of r and B' on the strategy outcomes of the game and the
investigation of how r and B' influence on the fishers' probability to cooperate. The first
analysis, which covered a broader range of values for the model's parameters, includes
the complete set of strategy outcomes for the model outputs. The second analysis is
limited to the set of model outputs that produced mixed strategies, which are obtained
from only some combinations of values for r and B' and the other parameters.STRATEGY OUTCOMES
Different combinations of the values of the parameters in the fisherygame, r, B',
ÔÁ, ÔB,and p, yield various outcomes of the game, which in general could bepure
strategy outcomes of (cooperative, cooperative), (cooperative, mixed), (mixed,
cooperative), (non-cooperative, non-cooperative), as wellas mixed strategy outcomes.
Furthermore, many combinations result in what I describeas negative (cooperative,
cooperative) outcomes, which is a special case that differs from the (cooperative,
cooperative) outcome mentioned above. Moreover,some combinations yield outcomes
that imply situations where there is no fishing.
The factor that determines these outcomes and theno fishing situation is the
profits at the payoffs. In general, for pure strategy outcomes, the fishers have eitherthe
cooperative or the non-cooperative as their dominant strategy, whichmeans that this
responses always result the best payoff for the fishers regardless of which strategy their
opponent plays. If both fishers have cooperative strategy as their dominant strategy, the
outcome of the game is the pure strategy outcome of (cooperative, cooperative).
However, the non-cooperative strategy in the fisherygame will never be the dominant
strategy for the fishers because the payoff for (non-cooperative, non-cooperative) iszero,
whereas the payoffs for the other strategies are positive. The outcomes normallywould
be either (cooperative, mixed) or (mixed, cooperative) whereone fisher has the
cooperative strategy as his dominant strategy while the other hasno dominant strategy.
For example the (cooperative, mixed) outcomeoccurs when the cooperative strategy is
the response for fisher A that yields the largest payoffno matter which strategy fisher B
plays, while neither the cooperative strategy nor the non-cooperativestrategy is the best70
response for fisher B. In this situation fisher B is better off by playing a mixed strategy. If
both fishers have no dominant strategy the outcome of the game is a mixed strategy
outcome. In other words, it is a situation where the game has no pure strategy
equilibrium. Table 5 shows examples of pure strategy outcomes and a mixed strategy
outcome.
Table 5. Examples of payoff matrices for pure strategy outcomes and a mixed
strategy outcome.
A) A (cooperative, cooperative) outcome
Fisher A
Fisher B
Cooperative Non-Cooperative
Cooperative (0.027, 0.027) (0.024, 0.008)
Non-cooperative (0.008, 0.024) (0,0)
B) A (cooperative, mixed) outcome
Fisher A
Fisher B
Cooperative Non-Cooperative
Cooperative (0.028, 0.024) (0.024, 0.053)
Non-cooperative (0.008, 0.021) (0, 0)71
Table 5. (continued)
Fisher A
Fisher A
C) A (mixed, cooperative) outcome
Fisher B
Cooperative Non-Cooperative
Cooperative (0.028, 0.027) (0.024, 0.0 12)
Non-cooperative (0.428, 0.024) (0, 0)
D) A mixed strategy outcome
Fisher B
Cooperative Non-Cooperative
Cooperative (0.021, 0.022) (0.016, 0.037)
Non-cooperative (0.046, 0.017) (0,0)
Figure 3 shows a special case that forces a negative (cooperative, cooperative)
outcome. This case occurs when the catch quota is larger than the catch that generates
zero profit. If the fishers catch their quota shares they will lose money because they need
to employ the level of effort at the quota (EQ) at which the fishing cost is greater than
fishing revenue. Both fishers are better off if they catch less than their quota shares and
are, therefore, forced into being cooperative and catching less than their quota shares.72
When the catch quota is smaller than the catch that generates zero profits, the fishers can
voluntarily accept their quota sharesthe catch quota requires level of effort less than the
effort level at the open access fishery (E-OA).
Figure 3. The special case where the catch quota is larger than the catch that generates
zero profit.
Total Cos
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The no fishing situation arises when the fishing revenues are less than the fishing
costs. This can occur when the stock is depleted, or when the fish price is too low relative
to the cost of fishing. Mathematically, the no fishing situation occurs whenever73
B' < 1/rho. The fishers will go fishing only when they can make profits, which is when
their revenue is greater than their fishing costs:
p*B*q>c
THE INFL UENCE OF rAND B' ON THE STRATEGY OUTCOMES OF THE
GAME
Despite an attempt to reduce the numbers of parameters, there still are five
parameters in the model. It is difficult to pinpoint which parameters are most important
and how they influence on the outcomes. One way to investigate the influence of each
parameter in a model is to vary them one at a time while fixing the others. Because this
thesis is concerned with the influence of biological parameters on fishers' cooperation, I
mainly investigate the influences of r and B' on the outcomes of the game given a limited
set of fixed values for bA, bB, and rho. Subsequently, the question ariseswhat values of
these parameters should I use?
A criterion for fixing the values of bA and bB can be based on hypothetical
situations that probably exist in a real fisheries system. For example, in practice we may
have a fisheries system in which all the fishers are homogeneouswhere the fishers have
the same tendencies to cooperate and attitudes towards uncertainty in the fish stock. In
this situation, the values of bA and bB are the same. Alternatively, we may have a fisheries
system where the fishers are heterogeneouswhere the fishers' tendencies to cooperate74
differ from one another. Therefore, the investigation of the influence of r and B' on the
outcomes of the game will be considered under various sets of values for bA and bB. Two
main situations are when the fishers are homogeneous and when they are heterogeneous.
Each of these two general situations will be further classified into more specific cases,
according to the values of bA and bB:
Homogeneous Fishers.
The case of homogeneous fishers can be subdivided into two situations where
both fishers have either high or low tendencies to cooperate. The outcomes from the two
situations may differ from one another. This situation is then further classified into two
cases:
Both fishers have high tendencies to cooperate. In this case, the fishers have the
same low value for the risk coefficient, bA = bB = 0.3.
Both fishers have low tendencies to cooperate. This case is similar to the first
one in that the fishers have the same value for the risk coefficient, but the coefficient is
high, bA = bB = 0.8.
Heterogeneous Fishers.
The situation of heterogeneous fishers can be classified into three specific cases:
Both fishers have high tendencies to cooperate. In this case, the values of the
fishers'riskcoefficients to cooperate are low, but they are differ from each other, bA =
0.2,bB=0.4.75
Both fishers have low tendencies to cooperate. Likewise, the values of the
fishers' risk coefficient differ from each other, but in this case are high, bA = 0.7,
bB=0.9.
One fisher has a high tendency to cooperate, while the other has a low tendency
to cooperate. For this last case, the two fishers are totally opposite in their tendencies to
cooperate, with an extremely low value of the risk coefficient for one fisher and an
extremely high value for the other, bA = 0.3, bB = 0.8.
The risk coefficients vary on a scale from 0.0 to 1.0, and the tendency to
cooperate varies inversely with the coefficient. The higher the value of the risk
coefficient, the lower is the tendency to cooperate. For example, if fisher A and fisher B
have risk coefficients of 0.4 and 0.6 respectively, then, fisher A has a higher tendency to
cooperate than fisher B. Table 6 shows the pairs of values for the risk coefficient of the
two fishers that are used in the analysis.
In these analyses (Table 6) I arbitrarily fix the value of rho to be equal to 6, which
is neither extremely low nor extremely high.
Given the above conditions, the analysis then centers on exploring how the
outcomes of the game change over the ranges of value for r and B', given the various
specific values for bA, bB, and the fixed value for rho. Subsequently, I vary the value of
rho to see how it influences the outcomes of the game.
In sum, there are two main questions for this model analysis to answer:
1. How r and B' influence the outcome of the game when the fishers' risk coefficients,
which reflect fishers' tendencies to cooperate, are taken into account?76
2. How r and B' influence the outcomes of the game when the profiticost ratio (rho) is
also taken into account?
Table 6. The fishers' risk coefficients used in the analysis.
Situations Cases hA bB
Homogeneous
Fishers
High value for the risk coefficient 0.8 0.8
Low value for the risk coefficient 0.3 0.3
Heterogeneous
Fishers
High values for the risk coefficients 0.7 0.9
Low values for the risk coefficients 0.2 0.4
Wide range in risk coefficient values 0.3 0.8
MIXED STRATEGIES: THE INFL UENCES OF rAND B' ON FISHERS'
PROBABILITY TO COOPERATE
The other primary analysis investigates how the fishers' probabilities to cooperate
are influenced by the values of r and B'. The strategy space for this analysis is limited to
mixed strategies. The analysis of the influences of r and B' on the strategy outcomes
indicated that the mixed strategies solutions are most likely to occur when both fishers
have low tendencies to cooperate, either when the fishers are homogeneous or
heterogeneous. I present results for the case of heterogeneous fishers where both fishers
have low tendencies to cooperate (bA = 0.7, bB = 0.9). The results for the heterogeneous
situation show the influences of r and B' on the fishers' probabilities to cooperate. They
also allow us to compare the probabilities of cooperation between the two fishers, who
differ in their tendencies to cooperate.77
Similar to the first primary analysis, I fix the value of rho equal to 6.0. Therefore,
we are looking at the same strategy outcomes as in the case of heterogeneous fishers with
bA=O.7andbB=O.9.78
V. MODEL ANALYSIS RESULTS
I present the results in two main sections. The first section is general results from
the primary analysis of the influences of the intrinsic growth rate (r) and stock size (B')
on the strategy outcomes of the game. The second section is the results from the
particular outcomes of the game that are mixed strategies. The first section includes
results from the investigation of the influences of r and B' on the strategy outcomes for
different sets of values for the fishers' tendencies to cooperate and when taking into
account the profit/cost ratio (rho).
Recall that a strategy outcome is an equilibrium solution of the game, which
indicates the strategies that the players choose to play. In the fishery game, the strategy
outcomes could be either (cooperative, cooperative), (cooperative, mixed),
(mixed, cooperative), (non-cooperative, non-cooperative), or mixed strategies. For
convenience in discussing the interpretation and implications of the fishery game, I
classify the strategy outcomes into two groups, desirable and undesirable outcomes. The
desirable outcomes are those that promote cooperation among the fishers in the
cooperative organization. The desirable outcomes are the (cooperative, cooperative)
strategy outcomes in which both fishers are voluntarily cooperative. The undesirable
outcomes are those outcomes that detract from cooperation among the fishers. They
include the strategy outcomes (cooperative, mixed) and (mixed, cooperative), mixed
strategies, as well as the situation where there is no fishing. I also consider as an
undesirable outcome the (cooperative, cooperative) strategy outcome from the special
case wherein the catch quota is larger than the catch that generates zero profits. For79
convenience in distinguishing between the two different (cooperative, cooperative)
situations, I specify the (cooperative, cooperative) situation where the fishers are
voluntarily cooperative as positive (cooperative, cooperative) and specify the other where
the fishers are forced to cooperate as negative (cooperative, cooperative).
THE INFLUENCE OF r AND B' ON THE STRATEGY OUTCOMES OF
THE GAME
Generally, both r and B' have an influence on the outcomes of the game as well as
on the fishers' probability to cooperate. But their specific influence depends on the
particular values for the fishers' tendencies to cooperate(ÔÃ, ÔB)and the ratio of profits
to the fishing costs (p). I present general results to demonstrate: (1) the influences of r
and B' on the outcomes of the game when the fishers' risk coefficients (bA, bB) are taken
into account, and (2) the influences of r and B' on the outcomes of the game when all
parameters, including rho, are taken into account.
INFLUENCES OFr AND B' ON STRATEGY OUTCOMES OF THE GAME
WHEN bA AND bB ARE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT
The effect of r or B' on the outcomes of the game cannot be meaningfully
interpreted without also considering the fishers' tendencies to cooperate(ÔÁ,ÔB).
Parameters r and B' appear to influence the outcomes of the game differently depending
upon the homogeneity/heterogeneity in the fishers' tendencies to cooperate, which are
determined by the fishers' risk coefficients bA and bB. Even in the situation where the
fishers are homogeneous (or heterogeneous), the outcomes of the game will differ80
between two cases that have different values for bA and bB, unless the two cases have
very close values for bA and bB.
Homogeneous Fishers.
When the fishers are homogeneous in their risk coefficients and thus have the
same tendency to cooperate, both fishers will have the same strategy solution. If fisher A
selects the cooperative strategy fisher B will do the same. However, the outcomes when
the fishers have high tendencies to cooperate differ from those for which the fishers have
low tendencies to cooperate. When the fishers have high tendencies to cooperate, the
most frequent outcomes of the game are the strategy outcomes of positive
(cooperative, cooperative). That is to say, the fishers are voluntarily cooperative for most
combinations of parameters r and B'. As the fishers' tendencies to cooperate decrease,
the outcomes are more likely to shift from desirable outcomes to undesirable outcomes.
The following two cases contrast the outcomes where the fishers have high versus low
tendencies to cooperate.
Both fishers have high tendencies to cooperate (low values for the risk
coefficients). Figure 4 shows a map of strategy outcomes of the fishery game when both
fishers have risk coefficient values of 0.3, given a fixed value for the profit/cost ratio
(rho) of 6. The map shows the combinations of rand B' that result in each of the
different strategy outcomes. When both fishers have high tendencies to cooperate, the
strategy outcomes of the game usually are the positive (cooperative, cooperative)
outcomes where both fishers voluntarily harvest only their quota shares. These outcomes
cover the area corresponding to values of B'> 1/rho and values of 0.00 <r < 0.44.However, as the value of r increases the boundary for the area of positive
(cooperative, cooperative) outcomes occurs at higher values of B'. A region of negative
(cooperative, cooperative) outcomes occurs at high values of r and low values of B'.
Between the area of positive (cooperative, cooperative) outcomes and the area of
negative (cooperative, cooperative) outcomes is the area where both fishers play mixed
strategies. The no fishing situation covers the area of low value of B' < 1/rho, across all
the values of r.
Figure 4. Strategy outcomes of the game at various combinations of r and B',
when bA = bB0.3, and rho = 6.
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In general, as the value of r increases the strategy outcome shifts from a desirable
outcome, positive (cooperative, cooperative), to an undesirable outcome. This can be
seen at a fixed value of B', such as at B' = 0.58. The strategy outcome is positive82
(cooperative, cooperative) where 0.00 <r < 1.88. Where 1.88 <r < 1.93 the strategy
outcome is mixed and then becomes negative (cooperative, cooperative) where r> 1.93.
Because the relative stock size (B') and rho are the same across the values of r, it seems
that the latter switch is affected by the increase in r, which causes a decrease in the
fishers' tendencies to cooperate. Given fixed values for bA and bB, the fishers' tendencies
to cooperate (ö1) decrease as the value of r increases because the tendency to co operate is
an inverse function of r and the fishers' risk coefficient,
l+(b1*r)
However, if b1 is zero then the term b1 * r is also zero and the tendency to cooperate is
independent of r. The map from the case of b10 (Figure 5) shows that the outcomes of
the game have a similar pattern as the outcomes fromb1= 0.3 and r still affects the
outcomes. This effect of r on the boundary between positive and negative outcomes is not
due to the fishers' tendencies to cooperate but comes directly from the way that r is
imbedded in the payoff function.
The outcomes that result in the no fishing situation exist where B' <1/rho, across
all values of r and of bA and bB. For the values of bA, bB, and rho given above, this
situation covers the area where B' ranges from 0.00 to 0.16. The low values of B' imply
that the stock has been depleted; the current stock size is very low relative to the unfished
stock. The profit from fishing is so low that it is outweighed by the fishing cost.83
Figure 5. Strategy outcomes of the game at various combinations of r and B',
when bA = bB = 0.0, and rho = 6.
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Both fishers have low tendencies to cooperate (high values for the risk
coefficients). In contrast to the outcomes when both fishers have high tendencies to
cooperate, the outcomes when both fishers have low tendencies to cooperate
(bA = bB = 0.8) are dominated by undesirable outcomes, especially mixed strategies
(Figure 6). The only area of positive (cooperative, cooperative) outcomes is the small
area where the values of B' are relatively low (from 0.19 to 0.34) and the values of r are
in the low to medium range (from 0.00 to 1.40).
The no fishing situation occurs at low value of B', where B' < 1/rho, across all
values of r, bA, and bB. The situation where both fishers are forced to cooperate has a84
similar pattern as in the case where hA = bB0.3. It starts at the value of B' = 0.19 and
moves upward to high values of B' as the value of r increases.
Figure 6. Strategy outcomes of the game at various combinations of r and B',
when bA = bB = 0.8, and rho =6.
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When both fishers have low tendencies to cooperate, the mixed strategies tend to
occur at high values of B' and also at high values of r. When the fishers have low
tendencies to cooperate, the high value of B' yields higher maximized profit, which
provides an incentive for the fishers to play mixed strategies. The high value of r induces
the fishers to play mixed strategies when facing opponents who have low tendencies to
cooperate. The more productive and variable the stock, the lower the fishers tendencies to
cooperate. However, because there is no dominant strategy for both fishers, the outcomes
of the game end up with mixed strategies (Table 7). If the game has cooperation as the85
dominant strategy for both fishers, the cooperative payoff for each fisher will be the
highest regardless of which strategy their opponents would play (as in the case where
both fishers have high tendencies to cooperate). Alternatively, if the game has non-
cooperation as the dominant strategy for both fishers, the non-cooperative payoffs for
each fisher will be the highest regardless which strategy their opponents would play. The
matrix game in the Table 7 shows neither of these two situations. Therefore, the best
response for both fishers is to play mixed strategies.
Table 7. Matrix game where both fishers play mixed strategies, given r = 0.72,
B'0.49, rho6, and bAbB = 0.8. The payoffs are presented in terms of
the profits relative to the unfished stock.
Player A
Player B
Cooperative Non-cooperative
Cooperative (0.032, 0.032) (0.025, 0.038)
Non-cooperative (0.038, 0.025) (0, 0)
Logically, one might expect that the area of the mixed strategy outcomes should
have spread out as the values of B' and r increase. Instead, the area of the mixed strategy
outcomes is reduced and is replaced by the positive (cooperative, cooperative) outcomes,
approximately at the range of B' from 0.19-0.43 and the range of r from 0.44 1.40. In
particular to the fishers who have low tendencies to cooperate, the maximized profit from
the fishery at these ranges of B' and r is not high enough to leave an excessive profit after
taking into account the profit at the quota. The fishers, therefore, are better off playing the86
cooperative strategy because their payoffs from playing this strategy are the highest
regardless of which strategies their opponent would play.
Compare the strategy outcomes from Figures 4 and 6. The most and least frequent
strategy outcomes on the two maps are swapped. Also, notice that the only difference
between the parameters for these two cases are the values of the fishers' risk coefficients,
bA and bB. The opposite outcomes from the two cases evidently indicate the strong
influence of the fishers' risk coefficients. The coefficients represent the fishers'
preferences in responding to stock uncertainty. The fisher whose coefficient is high is
more willing to take a gamble on stock uncertainty than the fisher whose coefficient is
low. Consequently, the fisher who has a high risk coefficient is less likely to cooperate.
The most frequent outcome from the case where thetwofishers have a low value for the
risk coefficient is positive (cooperative, cooperative), while the outcome where the two
fishers have a high value for the risk coefficient is usually mixed strategies.
Heterogeneous fishers.
The results from thetwocases where the fishers are homogeneous show that the
fishers' tendencies to cooperate influences the outcomes of the game just as much as r
and B'. The results in this part of the model analysis show that not only the fishers'
tendencies to cooperate but also the heterogeneity of the fishers has an influence on the
outcomes. But the influence of heterogeneity appears to be minor when compared to the
influence from the magnitude of the fishers' tendencies to cooperate.
Both fishers have high tendencies to cooperate. Despite the difference between
the fishers' tendencies to cooperate, the pattern of outcomes in this case is similar to the87
case of homogeneous fishers whose tendencies to cooperate are high (Figure 7). The
positive (cooperative, cooperative) outcome is the most frequent strategy outcome as in
the homogeneous cases, the no fishing situation occurs within the same range of B' and
across the entire range of r. Also, the negative (cooperative, cooperative) outcomes in this
case spread out and move upward as the value of r increases as seen in the previous cases.
Figure 7. Strategy outcomes of the game at various combinations of r and B',
whenbA = 0.2, bB= 0.4, and rho= 6.
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The only difference is that there are (cooperative, mixed) strategy outcomes when
the fishers are heterogeneous. In this setting fisher A has a higher tendency to cooperate
than fisher B because he has a lower value of the risk coefficient. The results show that
fisher A plays a cooperative strategy, while fisher B plays mixed strategies. Because of
his/her higher tendency to cooperate, fisher A appears to value the cooperative payoff88
more than fisher B does. As a result, the cooperative strategy becomes the dominant
strategy for himlher; that is to say fisher A is always better off by playing the cooperative
strategy (Table 8). In contrast, fisher B appears to value the cooperative payoff less than
fisher A. Consequently, fisher B has no dominant strategy and he/she is better off by
playing mixed strategies, playing the cooperative and non-cooperative strategies
randomly.
Table 8. Matrix game where fisher A plays the cooperative strategy, while fisher B
plays mixed strategies, given r = 1.48, B' = 0.31, rho = 6, bA = 0.2, and
bB = 0.4. The payoffs are presented in terms of the profits relative to the
unfished stock.
Player A
Player B
Cooperative Non-cooperative
Cooperative (0.095, 0.090) (0.078, 0.096)
Non-cooperative (0.05 1, 0.074) (0, 0)
A few mixed strategy outcomes occur between the areas of (cooperative, mixed)
outcomes and the negative (cooperative, cooperative) outcomes. Therefore, the direction
of the outcomes in the area above the area of no fishing shifts from desirable outcomes of
positive (cooperative, cooperative) to undesirable outcomes as the value of r increases.
However, the area of undesirable outcomes decreases as the value of B' increases. The
direction of the outcomes indicates that even though the fishers have high tendencies to
cooperate, high values of r cause undesirable outcomes, particularly with low values of
B'. The highly productive and heavily fished stock has more impact on the fishers'89
decision to cooperate than their tendencies to cooperate. Despite their high tendencies to
cooperate, the fishers are less willing to cooperate if the stock is highly productive and
heavily fished. In contrast, at higher values of B' the undesirable outcomes occur when
the value of r is extremely high. For example, at high values of B' (B' > 0.8) the positive
(cooperative, cooperative) outcomes extend until r = 1.96. Therefore, when the fishers
have high tendencies to cooperate the fishery is more likely to result in a cooperative
environment if the stock has not been depleted severely, despite the high productivity of
the stock and the heterogeneity of the fishers.
Both fishers have low tendencies to cooperate. In contrast to the case where the
heterogeneous fishers have high tendencies to cooperate, when the heterogeneous fishers
have low tendencies to cooperate the most frequent strategy outcomes are mixed
strategies (Figure 8). Additionally, the results show that there are many more strategy
outcomes of (cooperative, mixed) in this case than in the previous one. The area of the
(cooperative, mixed) outcomes occurs between the area of mixed strategies and the
positive (cooperative, cooperative) outcomes. Meanwhile, the areas for no fishing and
negative (cooperative, cooperative) outcomes have the same pattern as in all the previous
cases.
The rationale for why certain outcomes occur at certain ranges of r and B' can be
explained in the same fashion as in the previous cases. Because of the low tendencies to
cooperate, one fisher is more likely to play mixed strategies. The solution in this case
consequently yields many more (cooperative, mixed) outcomes than the case where the
fishers have high tendencies to cooperate. The contrast in the most frequent strategy
outcomes between the case where the fishers have high and low tendencies to cooperate(Fig. 7 versus Fig. 8) indicates that the magnitude of the fishers' tendencies to cooperate
is more important than the difference between fishers' tendencies to cooperate. The
factors that really control the strategy outcomes are bA and bB rather than (bA- bB). As
long as the fishers have similar tendencies to cooperate, i.e. both have high or both have
low tendencies, the outcomes are more likely to be positive (cooperative, cooperative)
outcomes or mixed strategies respectively. The heterogeneity of the fishers' tendencies to
cooperate results in a high tendency to cooperate for one fisher and a low tendency to
cooperate for his opponent, which in turn results in a dominant cooperative strategy for
the one fisher while his opponent has no dominant strategy; the outcomes are then
(cooperative, mixed).
Figure 8. Strategy outcomes of the game at various combinations of r and B',
whenbA0.7, b0.9, and rho =6.
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One fisher has high tendency to cooperate, while the other has low tendency to
cooperate. Figure 9 shows the strategy outcomes for the case where the two fishers'
tendencies to cooperate are opposite. Unlike the outcomes of the two previous cases
where the fishers are heterogeneous, when the fishers are extremely different in their
tendencies to cooperate the most frequent strategy outcome is the (cooperate, mixed)
outcome. However, the pattern of the positive (cooperative, cooperative) outcomes is
similar to that of the outcomes for the cases where the fishers have high tendencies to
cooperate, either when fishers are homogeneous (Fig. 4) or heterogeneous (Fig. 7). This
area occurs at low values of 0.18 <B' <0.42 and at values of 0.00 <r < 1.39. A limited
area of strategies occurs between the areas of (cooperative, mixed) outcomes and
negative (cooperative, cooperative) outcomes, as well as between the positive and
negative (cooperative, cooperative) outcomes. The areas of no fishing and negative
(cooperative, cooperative) outcomes have the same pattern as in all the previous cases.
The reason this case has (cooperative, mixed) outcomes so frequently is obvious.
Because the two fishers are opposite in their tendencies to cooperate, one fisher tends to
have the cooperative strategy as his dominant strategy while the other has no dominant
strategy. This area occurs at high values of B' where the maximized profit is high. The
excessive profit from fishing at the quota gives incentive to fisher B, who has a low
tendency to cooperate, to catch more than his quota share. He would rather not always
catch over his share due to the possibility that the other fisher might retaliate by playing a
non-cooperative strategy. To avoid having zero profit, he is better off playing mixed
strategies. Meanwhile fisher A, who has high tendency to cooperate, appears to have the
cooperative strategy as his dominant strategy because he highly values the cooperativepayoff. Having a healthy fishery, in which the stock is not heavily depleted, induces
fisher A to be satisfied with the profit from his quota share, which he perceives and
values as being highly profitable.
Figure 9. Strategy outcomes of the game at various combinations of r and B',
when bA = 0.3, bB = 0.8, and rho =6.
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The area of positive (cooperative, cooperative) outcomes occurs below the area of
(cooperative, mixed) outcomes, at lower values of B'. The range of values for B',
0.18 <B' <0.42 indicates a heavily depleted stock. In this area, both fishers are better off
cooperating. The excessive profit is too low and it is not worthwhile for the fishers to
catch more than their quota shares. However, within this same range for B' there are also
(cooperative, mixed) outcomes that mostly occur at higher values of r, r> 1.11. Recall
that at high values of r, the fishers who have low tendencies to cooperate are more likelyto play a mixed strategy. Therefore, the area between the positive
(cooperative, cooperative) outcomes and the mixed strategy outcomes in this range for
B' is an area of (cooperative, mixed) outcomes.
The tiny area of mixed strategies located between the area of (cooperative, mixed)
outcomes and negative (cooperative, cooperative) outcomes is more likely to occur at
higher values of r. This implies that a highly productive and variable stock provides an
incentive to catch over the quota shares for both fishers, especially when the stock is not
depleted. The high productivity (and high variability) of the stock decreases the fishers'
tendencies to cooperate. When the fishers' tendencies to cooperate are lower, the
incentive to play mixed strategies is greater than when the stock is only slightly depleted.
In sum, the fishers' tendencies to cooperate play an important role in the outcome
of the game in that the fishers who have high tendencies to cooperate are more likely to
play a cooperative strategy. The reason for this is that when the fishers have high
tendencies to cooperate, they place a greater value on the cooperative payoff than do
those who have lower tendencies to cooperate. In contrast, the fishers who have low
tendencies to cooperate are more likely to play mixed strategies because they value the
cooperative payoff less than those who have high tendencies to cooperate. As a result, the
fishers with high tendencies to cooperate have no dominant strategy. They therefore end
up playing mixed strategies.
Heterogeneity also an important influence on the outcome of the game.
Theoretically, if the degree of heterogeneity is high, it seems logical that the outcomes
would be more likely to be undesirable. The difference between fishers' tendencies to
cooperate results in different strategies being played by the two fishers, which is an94
undesirable outcome; such as (cooperative, mixed) or (mixed, cooperative). However, the
degree of heterogeneity appears to have only a minor influence compared to the value of
the fishers' tendencies to cooperate. As can be seen from the results in the heterogeneous
case where both fishers have low tendencies to cooperate (Fig. 8), the outcomes are
mostly undesirable. In contrast, most of the outcomes are desirable in the case of
heterogeneous fishers where both have high tendencies to cooperate (Fig. 7). The
outcomes from the last case, where the fishers are extremely different in their tendencies
to cooperate (Fig. 9), are also mostly undesirable. However, the undesirable
(cooperative, mixed) outcomes are more likely to be influenced by fisher B's low
tendency to cooperate.
The areas of no fishing and the negative (cooperative, cooperative) outcomes are
the same in all cases. This is because the boundaries for these two situations are based on
economic constraints that have nothing to do with the fishers' tendencies to cooperate.
The no fishing situation is identified by the constraint of profit being less than fishing
cost. Meanwhile, the situation of negative (cooperative, cooperative) outcomes is
identified by the constraint that the maximum profit is less than the profit at the quota.
Both profits are calculated without regard to of the fishers' tendencies to cooperate
(Chapter 4, Assigning the Payoffs).
INFL UENCES OF r AND B' ON OUTCOMES OF THE GAME WHEN RHO IS
ALSO TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.
Rather than having direct influence on the outcome of the game, rho actually
helps promote the most widespread strategy outcome of the game. For example, the area
of mixed strategy outcomes, which is the most frequent strategy outcome for the case of95
homogeneous fishers with low tendencies to cooperate, will increase as the value of rho
increases. To see the effect of rho compare the area of the mixed strategies in Figure 8
and 10. The area of the mixed strategies in Figure 8, where rho = 6, is smaller than the
area of the mixed strategies in Figure 10, in which rho = 10. Meanwhile, the areas for the
other strategy outcomes shrink as the value of rho increases. These include the area of no
fishing and the negative (cooperative, cooperative) outcomes, which did not vary among
all previous cases because rho was the same for all the previous cases. At higher values
of rho the no fishing area occurs in a narrow range of 0.00 <B' <0.06, but still across all
value of r, bA, and bB. Also, the area of negative (cooperative, cooperative) outcomes
occurs at lower values of B' and for a narrower range of B'. However, the shape of this
area is similar to those seen in the other cases; spreading out and moving upward at
higher values of r. The area of positive (cooperative, cooperative) outcomes still has the
same shape as in the other cases, but occurs for a narrower range of B'.
These features of enlarging and reducing areas for the different strategy outcomes
are caused by the change in profit in the fishery. High values of rho increase the profit
from fishing, which provides increased incentive to catch more than quota, particularly
for fishers who have low tendencies to cooperate. Compare the case of low and high
values of rho (Fig. 8 versus Fig. 10). The area in the range of 0.21 <B' <0.42 is the area
mostly positive (cooperative, cooperative) outcomes when the value of rho is 6, while
this area has mostly mixed strategy outcomes when the value of rho is 10. When the
value of rho is high the profit from the fishery is still pleasant even at lower values of B'.
As a result, the fishers who already have low tendencies to cooperate have incentive tocatch more than their shares. Consequently, when the value of rho is high, the area of
mixed strategy outcomes expands into the area where the values of B' are lower.
Figure 10. Strategy outcomes of the game at various combinations of r and B',
when bA = 0.7, bB = 0.9, and rho = 10.
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In contrast, greater profit reduces the area for the other strategy outcomes and it
also shifts those outcomes to lower values of B'. These lower values of B' represent a
heavily depleted stock. Despite a high profit/cost ratio, the maximized profit from the
fishery is not high enough for the fishers to catch more than their quota shares. Therefore,
in the area with low values for B' (0.12 <B' <0.24) and low to medium values for r
(0.00 <r < 1.40) the most frequent outcomes are positive (cooperative, cooperative)
outcomes. The area with lower values for B' at high r most frequently yield negative
(cooperative, cooperative) outcomes. The combination of a highly productive and97
variable stock and the fishers' tendencies to cooperate make the fishers perceive negative
profit from the fishery if they catch more than their shares because the maximized profit
is lower than the profit at the quota. When the stock is severely depleted (when the value
of B' is very low), the fishers cannot make a profit from the fishery and do not go fishing.
MIXED STRATEGIES RESULTS: INFLUENCES OF r AND B' ON FISHERS'
PROBABILITY TO COOPERATE
To see the influences of r and B on the fishers' cooperative behavior, consider
either fisher A's or B's probability to cooperate in Figure 11. The fishers' probabilities to
cooperate are labeled by two digits, representing the probability to cooperate for fisher A
and B respectively. For example, the label 7, 9 indicates outcomes where fisher A's
probability to cooperate(pA)is 0.7 while fisher B's probability to cooperate(PB)is 0.9. In
general, the fishers' probabilities of cooperating increase as the value of r increases but
decreases as the value of B' increases. However, this trend with respect to r and B'
applies only to some ranges of values for r and B'. For example, fisher A's probability of
cooperating at the value of B' = 0.58 is an increasing function of r for 0.00 <r < 1.79. But
for higher values of r, the probability is a decreasing function of r. Likewise, fisher A's
probability to cooperate at the value of r = 1.80 is an increasing function of B' when the
value of 0.42 <B' <0.75, but is a decreasing function of B' for the higher values of B'.
The incidence of non-linearity in the fishers' probabilities to cooperate relative to
the biological parameters, r and B', can be rationalized in the same fashion as in the
previous analysesby considering the profit that the fishers will gain at the given values
of the parameters in the model. For a comprehensive understanding, follow fisher A's
probability to cooperate at a fixed value of B' = 0.61. The probability increases as theFigure 11. Probabilities for cooperation of fisher A and B across the ranges of r and B', given bA = 0.7, b = 0.9, andrho = 6.
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Grohvalue of r increases, within the range of the values of 0.00 <r < 1.79. For the values of
r> 1.79, the probability decreases. Fisher A's tendency to cooperate, which is normally
low, becomes even lower because of the higher value of r. Consequently, he becomes less
cooperative when the stock is extremely productive and variable.
Now, consider the influence of B' on fisher A's probability to cooperate by
following his probability at a fixed value of r = 1.64. As the value of B' decreases the
profit from the fishery decreases, especially the excessive profit. Fisher A, whose
tendency to cooperate is low, will have less incentive to catch more than his share and
becomes more cooperative as the value of B' decreases. However, for B' <0.43, instead
of increasing, fisher A's probability to cooperate drops from 0.8 to 0.7 until B' = 0.37.
The excessive profit in this range of B' is less than that at higher values of B'. Fisher A
consequently becomes less cooperative. At lower values of B' profit at the quota is
greater than the maximized profit, which consequently forces the fishers to cooperate (the
negative (cooperative, cooperative) outcomes). The maximized profit keeps dropping as
the value of B' move towards 0.00, where the stock is completely exploited. The fishers
no longer make a profit and stop fishing.
For the comparison between fisher A's and B's probabilities to cooperate,
consider both fishers' probabilities to cooperate at a fixed value of r and B'. Although
fisher A has a higher tendency to cooperate than fisher B (bA = 0.7 versus bB = 0.9),
fisher A always has lower probability to cooperate. Recall that in the analysis of the
influence of r and B' on the strategy outcomes of the game fisher A is more likely to
cooperate than fisher B. In contrast, the analysis of the influences of r and B' on the
fishers' probabilities to cooperate shows that fisher A has a lower probability to100
cooperate. Both the strategy outcomes and the fishers' probability to cooperate depend on
the biological parameters and the fishers' tendencies to cooperate. The difference in how
the strategy outcome is specified versus how the probability to cooperate is specified is
that the outcome is based upon each fishers' own tendency to cooperate while the
probability is based upon his opponents' tendency to cooperate. Therefore, the strategy
outcomes work in an opposite manner from the probabilities to cooperate.
Fisher A's probability to cooperate depends on fisher B's payoff:
pA
2rBC +
When fisher A is facing an opponent, fisher B, who has a low tendency to cooperate,
fisher A will have a lower probability to cooperate. With the lower tendencies to
cooperate, fisher B's cooperative payoff is lower than that of fisher A; while his
non-cooperative payoff (itB) is higher than that of fisher A. Consequently, fisher A's
probability to cooperate is lower than that of fisher B. An implication of this surprising
result is that given a situation where the fishers are unsure about the decisionsofone
another, fisher A, who has a high tendency to cooperate, is less likely to play the
cooperative strategy because fisher A knows that fisher B has a low tendency to
cooperate. He also knows that with a lower tendency to cooperate, fisher B is more likely
to play a non-cooperative strategy as the value of r increases. On the average, it would be
better off for fisher A to play mixed strategies with low probability of playing a
cooperative strategy, especially when the stock is highly variable. Meanwhile, fisher B,
who is facing an opponent with a high tendency to cooperate, would be aware that fisher101
A may play a non-cooperative strategy, which will result in zero profits for both of them.
Similarly, on the average, it would be better for him to play mixed strategies with a high
probability of playing a cooperative strategy.102
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In previous chapters, I presented analyses of the fishery model to answer the
questions of interest, mainly whether the biological parameters, intrinsic growth rate (r)
and stock size (B), influence the outputs from the fishery model, the strategy outcomes of
the game and the fishers' probabilities to cooperate. The results of the analyses
demonstrated that the biological parameters influence the model output. Because of the
complexity of the fishery model, however, the influence of the biological parameterson
the model output can only be inferred after specifying the other parameters in the models.
The fishery model is a deterministic abstraction of real fisheries, which are stochastic
systems that involve uncertainty. Many parameters in the system should be treated as
random variables, including the profiticost ratio and the fishers' tendencies to cooperate.
These parameters influence the model output, as do the biological parameters.
Theoretically speaking, we would like to statistically test which parameter plays a
significant role in the model. Ideally, we would like to prove that the parameters of
interest significantly influence the model output so that we can fix the values of the other
parameters without concern that the outcome will be affected. However, this method is
unsuitable for the fishery model because the model output appears to depend on all
parameters.
Even though the fishery model was primarily developed for understanding
fishers' cooperative behavior, it would be beneficial if the model could also be used to
make predictions. For example, a question for model prediction could be: "What is the
probability of the fishers' cooperation when the stock is highly productive?" Without
knowing whether r is the most crucial parameter that influences the model output, it is103
impossible to predict the probability of the fishers' cooperation. A general prediction
cannot be made because r is not the only parameter that influences the output from the
fishery model. Different values of the other parameters yield different model output.
Then, the answer to the question of the fishers' probabilities of cooperating when the
stock is highly productive depends on the values of the other parameters, for instance,
whether there are high values for the profit/cost ratio and the fishers' tendencies to
cooperate.
Despite the inability to predict the exact likelihood of the model output in relation
to certain parameters of interest, the fishery model provides insight into important details
of fisher's cooperative behavior. It is also capable of answering many questions of
concern in fisheries management. The fishery model can do more than just answer the
questions posed at the very beginning of this thesis.
In the present chapter I discuss implications of the fishery model and,
subsequently, draw conclusions from this study. The discussion is specific to the
interpretation of the fishery model from the perspectives of economics and game theory.
To conclude this thesis, I concentrate on the applicability of the fishery model. I also
compare and contrast the conclusions drawn from this study with other studies. Further, I
compare the conclusions from this study with those from a case study of Japanese co-
management. In the last section on this chapter, I give suggestions for future research.
DISCUSSION
The fishery game sets up a situation where its members become suspicious of one
another regarding their cooperative commitment. Despite such a dubious environment for104
cooperation, the outcomes of the fishery game are not necessarily always mixed
strategies. They could potentially be any strategy outcome, including, surprisingly,
cooperative strategy outcomes. Which parameters of the model drive the fishers to decide
on a particular strategy cannot generally be determined because of the complexity of the
fisheries system and the many parameters that are involved. However, one index that we
could use to foresee a potential outcome of the game is the expected profit that the fishers
gain by playing their best response strategy.
The results show that the fishers' decisions to cooperate depend on the profit that
they perceive they will gain from being cooperative. The expected profit is a function
derived from the parameters r, B', bA, bB, and rho. These parameters determine the
fishing situations and profit information, which the fishers use to make a cooperative
decision. The logic of specif'ing the strategy outcomes for the game is simply based
upon the fishing situation. For example, if their expected cooperative profits are low, the
fishers are less willing to cooperate. Figure 12 shows profits as a function of fishing
effort from a fishery corresponding to three different fishing situations. Revenue 1 is the
fishers' gross incomes when the fishing situation is highly profitable, while revenue 2 is
less profitable and revenue 3 is unprofitable.EmaxiandEmaxare the levels of effort that
produce the maximized profit for revenue 1 and 2, and EQ is the effort at the quota. The
maximized profit corresponding to revenue 1 is the line segment BD and the profit
corresponding to the quota for revenue 1 is AC,105
Figure 12. Cost and revenue as a function of effort for three fishing condition:
(1) normal profit; (2) low profit; and (3) no fishing.
Revenue 1 is the situation where the fish stock is highly abundant and price is
high or cost is low. The fishers make reasonable profits when catching their quota shares
but the maximum profit from the fishery is higher than that of the quota (BD > AC),
which provides an incentive for the fishers to catch more than their shares. If this
situation occurs, the game outcome tends toward mixed strategies, especially when the
fishers have low tendencies to cooperate.
In the second fishing situation the fishery is less profitable due to fish scarcity,
low fish price, and/or high fishing cost. Although the revenue at the quota is relatively
high when compared to revenue from fishing atEmax2,the profit at the quota is negative106
because the fishers are fishing beyond the open access level. It is better for the fishers to
catch less than their quota shares, otherwise they lose money. Technically, the fishers end
up being cooperative, but I specify this case as a negative (cooperative, cooperative)
outcome.
The last situation is when the fishers do not go fishing. The fishery is completely
unprofitable. This is most likely to happen when the stock is scarce. The profit from
fishing is always lower than the total fishing cost.
In contrast to the strategy outcomes, the probability outcomes within the mixed
strategies space indicate that fisher B, who has the lower tendency to cooperate, has a
higher probability to cooperate than fisher A. One may feel that this result is awkward.
Intuitively and generally, we would expect that fisher A, who was the higher tendency to
cooperate, should be more likely to play the cooperative strategy than fisher B. By their
nature, the fishers who have high tendencies to cooperate should value cooperative
payoffs more highly than those whose tendencies to cooperate are low. The fishers with
high tendencies to cooperate are more conservative and less willing to gamble on the
uncertainty of the stock. However, because the fishers' cooperation is studied under an
application of game theory, one should keep in mind that the results should be interpreted
strictly from the game theory point of view. There are reasons such results appear to
contradict to our intuitive expectations.
When the strategic behavior of the fishers in a fishing cooperative organization is
represented as a game, the fishers actually are the players of the game and their aim is to
win--either to maximize their profits or minimize the damage that their opponent could
possibly impose. In this regard, rather than focusing on the cooperative commitment, the107
fishers focus on how to play to win the game. The fishers choose how frequently they
should play the cooperative strategy so that they can be as well off as possible given that
the other fisher may or may not play the cooperative strategy.
In terms of playing a game, the tendency to cooperate in response to uncertainty
about the fish stock has nothing to do with the players' choice of a particular strategy.
The player chooses the cooperative strategy, for example, only when it can lead to his/her
winning. In particular to mixed strategies, the outcome of the game depends on whether
the probability of playing the cooperative strategy is considered to be the best response
for the player. Playing the cooperative strategy with low frequency could lead to winning
under some circumstances, whereas playing the cooperative strategy with high frequency
could be better under other circumstances. The fishers' tendencies to cooperate represent
the fishers' preference to behave in a certain manner in response to a certain
circumstance. High tendencies to cooperate imply that the fishers prefer to cooperate but
their final decision to play any strategy is based upon their expected maximum profits.
In the context of game theory, particularly with regard to mixed strategies, when a
player plays his best response, at his equilibrium point, he imposes the condition that his
opponent has the same average payoff regardless of what strategy the opponent plays.
An example is the case of mixed strategies shown in Table 9. Using equations (27) and
(30) the mixed strategy outcome equilibrium of the game is (0.524, 0.727), which
corresponds to the equilibrium payoff of (0.030, 0.026). This means that when fisher A
plays his best response by choosing the cooperative strategy with the probability of
0.524, fisher B will get an average payoff of $ 0.026 no matter which strategy fisher B
chooses (Table 10). Likewise, when fisher B plays his best response by choosing thecooperative strategy with probability of 0.727, fisher A will get an average payoff of
$ 0.030 no matter which strategy fisher A plays (Table 11).
Table 9. Mixed strategy equilibrium outcome given r = 0.4, B' = 0.6, bA = 0.7,
bB = 0.9, and rho = 6. Note that the expected payoffs are the profits from the
fishing relative to the unfished stock and price (scaled by K and P).
Fisher A
Fisher B
Cooperative Non-Cooperative
Cooperative (0.032, 0.030) (0.024, 0.050)
Non-cooperative (0.041, 0.022) (0,0)
0.727 0.273
What this thesis finds is not unusual. How the two fishers react can be
alternatively explained from perspectives other than the game theory perspective.
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0.524
0.476
Examples are the experimental studies of Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee (1977) and
Kelly and Stahelski (1970). These two studies aim at understanding individuals'
cooperative behavior and individuals' expectations of what others would do, given people
that are cooperative or competitive. Both studies found that individuals expect others to
do the same as they do, regardless of their personalities. They expect others to cooperate
when they, themselves, cooperate; they expect others to be uncooperative when they are
uncooperative. Furthermore, the study of Kelly and Stahelski gives more details on
differences in expectations regarding other people's actions. They found that cooperators109
expect that others could either be cooperative or competitive. As a consequence, the
cooperators are cooperative when experiencing other cooperators, while they are more
likely to become competitive when experiencing competitors. In contrast, the competitors
expect others to be as competitive as they are. Therefore, competitors would play the
game with the expectation that others are likely to do the same as they do, and play the
non-cooperative strategy.
Table 10. Fisher B's payoffs at all possible mixed strategies combinations.
pA/pB0.0000.2000.4000.5000.6000.7000.7270.8000.9001.000
0.0000.0000.0040.0090.0110.0130.0150.0160.0180.0200.022
0.1000.0050.0090.0120.0140.0160.0170.0180.0190.0210.023
0.2000.0100.0130.0150.0170.0180.0200.0200.0210.0220.024
0.3000.0150.0170.0190.0200.0210.0220.0220.0230.0230.024
0.4000.0200.0210.0220.0230.0230.0240.0240.0240.0250.025
0.5000.0250.0250.0250.0260.0260.0260.0260.0260.0260.026
0.5240.0260.0260.0260.0260.0260.0260.0260.0260.0260.026
0.6000.0300.0290.0290.0280.0280.0280.0280.0270.0270.027
0.7000.0350.0340.0320.0310.0310.0300.0300.0290.0280.028
0.8000.0400.0380.0350.0340.0330.0320.0320.0310.0300.028
0.9000.0450.0420.0390.0370.0360.0340.0340.0320.03 10.029
1.0000.0500.0460.0420.0400.0380.0360.0350.0340.0320.030
The fishers in the fishery model are equivalent to the competitors and cooperators
in the studies mentioned above. The fishers who have high tendencies to cooperate are
cooperators, while those who have low tendencies to cooperate are competitors.
Therefore, it is not unusual that the fishers with high tendencies to cooperate play the
cooperative strategy with lower probability than the fishers with low tendencies to110
cooperate. With the expectation that the others will do the same as they do, the fishers
who have low tendencies to cooperate expect that the others will play the
non-cooperative strategy, which will lead to zero profit for both parties. The fishers with
low tendencies to cooperate tend to play the cooperative strategy with higher probability
to avoid the zero profit.
Table 11. Fisher A's payoffs at all possible mixed strategies combinations.
pA/pB0.0000.2000.4000.5000.6000.7000.7270.8000.9001.000
0.0000.0000.0080.0160.0210.0250.0290.0300.0330.0370.041
0.1000.0020.0100.0170.0210.0250.0290.0300.0330.0360.040
0.2000.0050.0120.0190.0220.0250.0290.0300.0320.0360.039
0.3000.0070.0130.0200.0230.0260.0290.0300.0320.0350.038
0.4000.0100.0150.0210.0240.0260.0290.0300.0320.0350.037
0.5000.0120.0170.0220.0240.0270.0290.0300.0320.0340.037
0.5240.0130.0170.0220.0240.0270.0290.0300.0320.0340.036
0.6000.0140.0190.0230.0250.0270.0290.0300.0310.0330.036
0.7000.0170.0200.0240.0260.0280.0290.0300.0310.0330.035
0.8000.0190.0220.0250.0270.0280.0290.0300.0310.0320.034
0.9000.0220.0240.0260.0270.0280.0300.0300.0310.0320.033
1.0000.0240.0260.0270.0280.0290.0300.0300.0300.0310.032
Here is another explanation for the counter-intuitive results from the fishery
game. The mixed strategy probabilities are suggestions to the players of what would be
the best reaction for them under a certain circumstance of the game. The results in this
thesis suggest that fishers who have a high tendency to cooperate will be better off if they
are less likely to cooperate when facing an opponent who has a low tendency to111
cooperate. The fisher with a high tendency to cooperate perceives that his opponent is
less likely to play the cooperative strategy. When the fisher with the high tendency to
cooperate plays the cooperative strategy and his opponent plays the non-cooperative
strategy, his fishing cost is higher than if his opponent plays the cooperative strategy.
Therefore, it is better for him to be less likely to play the non-cooperative strategy.
Meanwhile, the risk prone fishers will be better off if they are more cooperative,
especially when r is high. Given a highly productive stock, the fisher is aware that his
cooperative opponent will not always play the cooperative strategy, in which case both
fishers will get zero profit.
To win a game does not necessarily mean getting the highest payoff because there
are also constraints to consider, especially in a game where the players also need to
defend themselves. In a strategic situation, what one player does could impact or damage
the others. For example, the decision by one fisher to play the non-cooperative strategy in
the fishery game imposes higher costs on the other fisher. It is better for the fisher paying
the high fishing cost to play a strategy that helps minimize this damage. To maximize the
payoff under this circumstance means minimizing the damage imposed by the opponent.
The equilibrium outcome of the game is not the point where the players absolutely get the
highest payoffs. It is the point where all the players play their best responsesgetting the
maximum payoffs while holding damages to a minimum. The best responses are the
strategies that take into account the maximum payoffs while constraining the possible
damages.112
CONCLUSIONS
The fishery model answers the questions: (1) how do the biological parameters,
intrinsic growth rate and stock size, influence cooperation; and (2) given heterogeneity in
the fishers' tendencies to cooperate, how do the biological parameters influence
cooperation. The biological (r, B'), social (bA, bB), and economic (rho) parameters are all
significant in the model. Because the model is non-linear and has complicated
interactions amongst all parameters, no general statement can be made if any one
parameter is isolated from the others. Although this thesis concentrates on the influence
of the biological parameters, their influence must be viewed in the context of the
accompanying non-biological parameters.
The biological parameters have the opposite influence when both fishers have a
high tendency to cooperate versus when both fishers have a low tendency to cooperate.
When the fishers have a high tendency to cooperate, having an abundant stock (high
value of B') promotes desirable outcomes from the game, even if the stock is highly
productive and variable (high value of r). The fishers are more likely to cooperate when
the stock is abundant. In contrast, when the fishers have a low tendency to cooperate, an
abundant stock encourages the fishers to catch more than their quota shares, especially
when the stock is also highly productive and variable.
This thesis finds that the profiticost ratio (rho) plays a role in the fishery model as
a promoter of the most widespread strategy outcomes. It scales up the most prevalent
strategy outcome of the game, expanding the strategy outcome into wider ranges of r and
B', e.g., extending the positive (cooperative, cooperative) outcome into larger ranges of r
and B' when the game mainly yields this outcome. Hence, even in situations where the113
stock is highly productive or the stock size is low, there can be a good chance for
cooperation if the profit is high.
Another focus of this thesis is the fishers' heterogeneity. It should be noted that
the fishers' heterogeneity in this thesis differs from that in some studies, such as the study
of Wilen (1970) that considers the fishers' heterogeneity in fishing effort. This thesis
considers that fishers are heterogeneous in their tendency to cooperate. The heterogeneity
contributes greatly to the outcome of the game when the degree of heterogeneity is high,
when the two fishers' tendencies to cooperate are opposite. Because the fishers'
tendencies to cooperate differ from one another, the (cooperative, mixed) and (mixed,
cooperative) outcomes are the most frequent strategy outcomes. One fisher has the upper
hand over the other in choosing which strategy to play, while the other has no better
choice than playing the cooperative strategy. When the degree of heterogeneity is low,
the outcomes are influenced by the fishers' tendency to cooperate. If both players have
high tendencies to cooperate, the outcomes are usually desirable. However, if the players
have low tendencies to cooperate, the outcomes are usually undesirable and dominated by
mixed strategies.
The contribution of the fishers' heterogeneity to the strategy and probability
outcomes are consistent with the conclusions of Kelly and Stahelski (1970) and Dawes,
McTavish, and Shaklee (1977), that an individual's behavior is a function of the person
and his/her social environment. An individual's action is likely to depend on what other
people do. This thesis also concludes that the fishers' cooperative behavior is a function
of their tendencies to cooperate and their social environment in the fisheries system. The
fishers are more likely to cooperate if others do. If the cooperative organization is114
populated primarily by fishers whose tendencies to cooperate are low or by fishers whose
tendencies to cooperate differ from one another, cooperation is unlikely to persist because
the fishers' expectation of cooperation from the others is low. Another finding from this
thesis that is consistent with the conclusion of Kelly and Staheiski is that the fishers who
have low tendencies to cooperate perceive that others also have low tendencies to
cooperate. Because of their awareness, the fishers with a low tendency to cooperate
assume that other fishers will not cooperate and they actually have a greater probability
of cooperation than fishers with a higher tendency to cooperate.
The case studies given in the literature review section support the findings of this
thesis that biological parameters have an influence on fishers' cooperation. There are
three main lines of support: (1) the evidence from the more successful management of the
lobster fishery of the Katsuura FCA of adjusting and incorporating the limited entry and
profit-sharing pool accounting system based upon biological concerns; (2) the evidence
from the less successful management of Sukuma Bay FCA and the flachinohe FCA that
the regulations have never been adjusted and incorporated other supportive programs so
as to deal with biological characteristics of fish stocks; and (3) the declining membership
in the successful Nomaike FCA, which have resulted from uncertainty about the
biological status of the fish stock.
The discussion and conclusions supply us information and understanding about
fishers' cooperative behavior. At this point, the question is whether the abstract fishery
model is applicable to real world situations. In traditional modeling, researchers need to
validate their models. In broad terms, model validation is a process of testing how close a
model is to the real system that is being studied (Gass, 1983; Heafner, 1996; Shannon,115
1975). Because of the lack of sufficient information about real fisheries co-management
systems, a rigorous validation of the fishery model is impossible at this time.
Alternatively, I will use what information exists about real fisheries co-management
systems to show that the model seems to be valid and applicable. In the following section
I demonstrate that, rather than simply answering the questions posed at the beginning of
this thesis, an additional contribution of the fishery model is its application to fisheries
co-management.
APPLICATIONS OF THE FISHER YMODEL
The fishery model is developed for understanding the particular influence on
fishers' cooperation of the biological characteristics of the fish stock. Its application is,
therefore, primarily for helping fishery managers understand various aspects of a fishery
cooperative. Another benefit that we can potentially gain from the model is suggestions
for management.
Understanding Fisheries Cooperative Systems.
In a fisheries cooperative, the fishery manager has ideas about the status of the
fish stocks, prices for fish, costs of fishing, and fishers' tendencies to cooperate. The
manager can apply the fishery model to project whether cooperation will continue and
answer questions of concern about the current system such as: how much cooperation we
are having; is it possible for the manager to push the system to a desirable outcome;
which parameter(s) can the manager control to perturb the system towards a desirable
outcome; and how much work does the manager need to put in so as to get a desirable116
outcome? These questions can be answered directly by using estimates for r, B', fish
price, fishing cost, and the fishers' tendencies to cooperate as inputs to the fishery model.
The model also allows the manager to look at strategy outcomes or probability outcome
profiles for ranges of r and B', as presented in the results section. The outcome profiles
are advantageous when the manager is unsure about the precise values for r and B' or
when the manager considers that the values of r and B' may change.
Commercial fishing is a business involving considerable uncertainty, which is a
consequence of variability in catch rates, stock sizes, biological parameters, equipment
failure, fish prices, weather, quality of inputs, and internal and external institutions
(Gates, 1984; Hildén and Kaitala, 1991; Plourde and Bode!!, 1984). The uncertainty in
fisheries results in various forms of fishers' behavior. The fishers' response to uncertainty
has not been studied extensively, especially the uncertainty caused by biological
parameters, such as intrinsic growth rate and stock size. Most fisheries researchers have
traditionally treated these sources of uncertainty as constant parameters or deterministic
variables in the fishery systems under study. However, it has been recognized that
biological parameters are not constant over time (Hildén and Kaitala, 1991; Sissenwine,
1984a). Their values may vary seasonally or annually depending upon environmental
changes. Within a certain period the manager will be unsure about the real values of the
biological parameters because they may have changed. The outcome profiles provide the
manager a potential scope of outcomes for likely ranges of values for r and B'.
In the worst case, wherein the manager cannot obtain all the information needed
for the model, he/she can use the available information and focus on the outcome profile
over ranges of values for the unavailable parameters, possibly including their actual117
values. For example, if the fishers' tendencies to cooperate are unobtainable, the manager
can look at the outcome profile versus the likely range of values for the fishers'
tendencies to cooperate. Recall that the fishers' probabilities to cooperate are calculated
using the same parameter values (r, B', and rho). The only difference between the
equations for the two fishers isb1(bA versus bB). Because the values of bA and bB are in
the same range from 0 to 1, the fishers' probabilities to cooperatej (p and PB) behave
identically over a given range for b1 as shown in Figure 13 for the range ofb1from 0.4 to
1, given r = 0.2, B' = 0.7, and rho = 13. For the values of b1 less than 0.4, the fishers'
probabilities to cooperate are equal or greater than one, which means the cooperative
strategy is dominant. If the fishers are homogeneous, their probabilities to cooperate are
the same and the probability outcomes for both fishers are at the same point on the
outcome profile line. If the fishers are heterogeneous, their probabilities to cooperate are
located at different points on the line. For example, suppose the manager believes that
fisher A has a lower tendency to cooperate than fisher B (bA> bB) and that the risk
coefficients are approximately bA = 0.8 and bB = 0.5. The probability that fisher B
cooperates (pB), corresponding to fisher A's risk coefficient of 0.8, is roughly 0.4.
Meanwhile the probability that fisher A cooperate (pA), corresponding to fisher B's risk
coefficient of 0.5, is roughly 0.7. Therefore, given a fishery that has a moderately fast
growing stock with relatively high stock size and high profit/cost ratio, the fishery model
suggests that cooperation is not likely when the fishers are heterogeneous, especially
when one fisher has a low tendency to cooperate relative to the other. Moreover, we can
see from the probability outcome profile that the wider the gap between the two fishers'118
risk coefficient the less likely that both fishers will cooperate. The probabilities for the
two fishers move away from one another.
Figure 13. Probability outcomes at a given range of bA or b8, given r = 0.2, B'0.7,
andrho= 13
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In the case that information on the profit/cost ratio is also unavailable, the
manager can apply the fishery model to generate an outcome profile between the fishers'
probabilities to cooperate versus the profit/cost ratio and bA or bB. The example shown in
Figure 14 shows fisher B's probability to cooperate (PB) across ranges of values for the
fisher A's risk coefficient (bA) and rho, given the values of r = 1.9 and B' = 0.5. Each of
the dotted lines represents a contour of constant probability. The outcome profilesFigure 14. Fisher B's probability to cooperate across the values of fisher A's risk coefficient and rho.
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represent the probability outcomes over the range of bA from 0 to 1, and the range of rho
from 0 to 20. The model tells the manager that if the fishery has a fast growing stock that
has been fished down to the MSY level (B = lA*K), the following events may be
expected: (1) There is about a fifty-fifty chance that cooperation will continue when the
profiticost ratio is low, regardless of the fishers' tendencies to cooperate (dotted line
labeled 0.5); (2) The boundary between the dominant cooperative and mixed strategies is
the contour line where the probability equals one. The boundary tells us that if the fishers
have high tendencies to cooperate (b1 < 0.5) cooperation is very likely provided the
profiticost ratio is not very low (rho> 5).
Suggestions from the Fishery Model for Co-management
The fishery model is developed based upon a fishery that is managed with a quota
system. Any fisheries co-management that uses a quota system can benefit directly from
suggestions from the fishery model. For a fishery cooperative that relies on a system not
based on a harvest quota the fishery model can be modified and adjusted to suit the
system. The following are suggestions that the managers can use to achieve secondary
benefits from the fishery model.
The managers can use the fishery model to adjust restrictions on the quota so as to get
legitimate regulation. When the quota is high, the fishers have less incentive to exceed
their quota shares because the profit at the quota may be close to the maximized
profit,making the fishers indifferent between the two profits. This finding is similar to
evidence that Hønneland (2000) finds in his investigation of how Norwegian and Russian121
fishers abide by their cooperative fishing regulations. He notes that when the fish stock is
abundant and the quota is high, the fishers have no incentive to fish illegally.
Polinac and Carmo (1980), who studies Portuguese fishers' attitudes toward
cooperation, also found similar evidence. They concluded that when a fish stock is
increasingly abundant the fishers feel less uncertain about the stock and they become
more conservative in their fishing. They also suggest that, together with abundance of the
stock, good conimunication will reduce lack of trust, resulting in a higher tendency to
cooperate.
Under normal circumstances where the fishery is profitable and the profit at the
quota is less than the maximized profit from the fishery, the fishery model suggests that
one way to promote cooperation is by increasing the quota because this action reduces the
gap between the maximized profit and the quota profit. When the quota profit is very
close to or at the same level as the maximized profit, the fishers have no reason to exceed
their quotas. When a fishery is healthy and the maximized profit from the fishery is high,
the difference between the maximized profit and quota profit is large. The extra profit
provides a incentive for the fishers to catch more than their quotas. The manager should
recognize this situation and be prepared for rule breaking. The fishery model further
suggests that more cooperation can be gained by reducing the gap between the
maximized profit and the quota profit.
However, increasing the quota may in the long term result in an overexploited
stock. Theoretically, the quota, which is derived from the estimated fishing rate that will
produce the MSY, represents a long term commitment to stock sustainability. It is the
level of catch that conceptually guarantees sustainability. If the manager tries to satisfy122
the fishers in the short run and insure their cooperation by increasing the quota, the
manager should be aware of the trade off and consequences from doing so. The manager
should ask himself whether he wants to risk stock overexploitation.
A critical point that the managers should be concerned with is high fish price,
especially if the members of the cooperative have low tendencies to cooperate. This
thesis finds that when fish price is high the fishers with low tendencies to cooperate have
more incentive to exceed their quota shares. As the price goes up, the maximized profit
increases as well as the profit at the quota. The gap between the maximized profit and the
quota profit remains wide, which provides an incentive for the fishers to catch over their
quota shares. But if we increase the quota, only the quota profit is higher. The gap
between the maximized profit and quota profit narrows and the incentive to catch over
the quota decreases.
LIMITATIONS OF THE FISHERYMODEL AND SUGGESTIONS FOR
FUTURE RESEARCH
Like other models the fishery game is based on assumptions. These assumptions
limit the model's capability to answer certain questions. In this section, I specify some of
the limitations of the fishery model and offer corresponding suggestions for future
research.
The fishery model has limitations on its application to fisheries cooperatives that
for practical purposes do not use a harvest quota system. Most fisheries co-management
systems focus on territorial use rights and licensing. Only a few cooperatives use harvest
quotas in their management, for example, the Gull Haven and Shoal Harbor Cooperatives
in the US Eastern Seaboard area, and the UK cooperatives known as producers'123
organizations (Jentoft, 1989; McCay, 1980). The Japanese case studies reviewed in this
thesis are examples of cooperative systems based on territorial use rights and licenses. A
common problem arising in fisheries cooperatives, as in the case studies, is illegalfishing
in prohibited fishing grounds. The problem of illegal fishing appears to be a consequence
of improper exercise of fishing rights and enforcement, compounded by the problem of
declining fish stocks. Each fishing village in a prefecture is granted fishing rights in a
different type of fishery and different fishing grounds. The fishers in one village illegally
fished in fishing grounds other than their own because of high prices and declining
stocks. On economic grounds it seems obvious that the different levels of profit between
the two fisheries was the driving force for the illegal fishing activity. There is no other
evidence to explain the fishers' behavior. The problem is similar to the one modelled in
the fishery game in that economic forces can outweigh the cooperative commitment.
However, the driving force for such a breakdown in commitment is different than in the
fishery game. Modifying or adjusting the fishery model to capture this problem appears
to be inappropriate. Rather, a spatially explicit model without quotas is needed.
Because the fishery game is a one period game, the fishery model cannot address
long term effects of either cooperation or stock sustainability. For example, if the
managers decide to promote cooperation by increasing the quotait is not certain that over
the long term this action would result in stock depletion. Likewise, if the managers'
primary decision is to sustain the stock by imposing restrictive fishing regulations, the
fishery model cannot show the long-term consequences of excessive harvests due to
cheating. Restrictive regulations always create pressure on the fishers, which can break
down cooperation with the harvest quota. The fishery model could be run iteratively,using the unharvested fish plus recruitment as initial stock size for each successive
period.
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In the fishery game I assume that there is no enforcement of the harvest quotas or
penalties for cheating. The original idea of omitting a penalty from the fishery game was
to understand when and how cooperation would voluntarily emerge in a fisheries
cooperative. In addition, having a penalty in the fishery model means that the fisheries
cooperative must have a monitoring system, which is costly and contradicts the rationale
for co-management. A major benefit of co-management is supposed to be low costs of
enforcement. The fishery model does provide an understanding of natural and voluntary
cooperative behavior, which was the primary aim for this thesis. However, this
assumption may be unrealistic when we want to look at how fishers react to the existing
systems, as most cooperatives require their members to directly monitor their compliance
with regulations.
A penalty could be imbedded in the non-cooperative payoff function. For
example, the penalty could be specified as a probability of getting caught, with higher
profits resulting in a greater chance of the penalty and hence a lower payoff on average.
However, a real fishing cooperative might have a more severe penalty, such as
membership cancellation for fishers who violate their harvest quotas. In this case we
could set up zero profit to represent the cancellation (which means the game ends for
those fishers) once the violation is detected. In this scenario, we need to specify in the
model how the violation would be detected during the fishing season.
Because the fishery game only has two players, the fishery model cannot directly
examine the case of more than two players. The fishery model still may be reliable for a125
cooperative where there are more than two fishers. Especially for the case where all the
fishers are reasonably homogeneous in their tendencies to cooperate and the case where
the fishers can be classified into two distinct groups whose tendencies to cooperate are
different. The fishery model could be extended to an n-person game but the mathematics
would be much more complicated.
The assumption of zero profit for the (non-cooperative, non-cooperative)
outcomes may be unrealistic for some fisheries because the fishers are limited in how
much effort they can apply during a fishing season. The rationale for zero profit is that
when both fishers decide to exceed their quota shares, they continue fishing until it is no
longer worth their while to do so. Consequently, the fishers make normal profits of zero.
However, the fishers may not be capable of taking the open-access level of harvest, in
which case the non-cooperative payoffs will be greater than zero. Assigning this
non-cooperative payoff is complicated because we do not know how much each of the
fishers will catch. One way to deal with this problem is to assume that the two fishers
have the same maximum amount of fishing effort that they can employ during the fishing
season. The non-cooperative payoffs would be determined by this maximum level of
fishing effort or the effort required for open-access, whichever level of effort was
smaller.
The fishery model only considers two biological parameters, the intrinsic growth
rate and the stock size, because those two parameters are the main contributors to stock
fluctuation and availability of fish for the fishery. There may be other biological
characteristics that should be included in the fishery model, either for better
understanding of fishers' cooperation or for finding better management programs, for126
traits may result in certain responses from the fishers that could harm the stock and cause
problems in the cooperatives because stocks with differing traits may be differently
susceptible to fishing pressure. For example, lobsters are an organism with special
biological characteristics. Their tendency to aggregate and be relatively immobile results
in high competition among fishers to be the first in getting to and taking control over the
fishing grounds. Knowledge of this can contribute to better management if the managers
can adjust regulations or introduce new management programs to deal with such
problems, as in the Katsuura FCA that introduced a profit-sharing pool accounting
system for its lobster fishery.127
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